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While there are many studies on the buzz-word populism, there are far fewer studies on how 
populism effects crisis management. When the World Health Organization declared the 
COVID-19 disease a global pandemic on March 11th, no one knew that Latin America would 
be declared the epicentre of the pandemic by WHO on May 26th , and still be the epicentre over 
a year later. Although Brazil is a relatively advanced state compared to most of its Latin 
American neighbours, the first half of 2020 with the pandemic proved challenging for Brazil. 
Brazil performed worse than what could be expected in terms of deaths and infected, given its 
level of medical expertise. 
Previous research defines populism in two main categories; one school of thought refed to as 
the ideational approach views populism as a thin ideology which gets adopted by a leader who 
already possesses a main ideology. Populism thus becomes a strategic approach, supplementing 
an addition underlying ideology. The second school of thought to understanding populism, is 
the Essex school which understands populism to be a discourse, where the pure people versus 
the corrupt elite are the core of what constitutes populism. I adopt the ideational approach in 
this study. Studying COVID-19 had me face challenges given its ongoing character, in addition 
to the nature of the pandemic this study is performed during. I could not travel to Brazil, nor 
conduct interviews. Given the limitations, the study analyses a large sample of qualitative data: 
6325 Brazilian newspaper publications. After analysing and structuring the policy responses 
from Bolsonaro chronologically, I looked into what constituted Brazil’s populist President Jair 
Bolsonaro’s crisis management in his response to COVID-19 via McKee et al. (2020) four 
mechanisms of populism; (1) Blaming outsiders and victims, (2) Contempt for institutions, (3) 
Denialism and (4) Suspicion of elites. 
Contrary to what was assumed, Brazil did experience large numbers of deaths and infected 
compared to neighbouring countries. My findings indicate that Bolsonaro’s crisis handling 
showed large signs of his populist approach, which in turn I found to be marked by blaming 
outsiders and victims, contempt for institutions, denialism, and suspicion of elites. A report for 
the Universidade de São Paulo concludes that Bolsonaro and his government actively worked 
for the virus to spread, wanting it to resume the normal economic activity the pandemic 
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This master’s thesis is dedicated to independent journalism and the crucial but deadly job the 
worlds journalists are doing while providing the public with truthful information.  
A special note is to be given to women journalists, who face twice the level of danger as their 
male colleagues.  
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We enter 2020 and had the problem of the pandemic which, in my understanding, was overrated.  
- Jair Bolsonaro. (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 90). 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Setting the stage 
 
The notorious "wet market" in the Chinese city Wuhan selling fresh meat, seafood and live 
exotic wildlife became famous as it was pointed out as the source of the COVID-19 virus 
outbreak (MacQueen, Farache and Grigore 2020, 285). The COVID-19 virus is close in 
resemblance to other viruses found in horseshoe bats and is believed to originate from this type 
of bat, and then transmitting possibly via an intermediary host such as a pangolin (World 
Organisation for Animal Health 2020).1 According to the Financial Times, the hashtag "Wuhan 
Sars" was trending on a Chinese blog by December 30th, as it became censored (Kynge, Yu and 
Hancock, 2020).2 The news agency Associated Press reported that the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping's political repression allegedly made officials more hesitant to report cases without 
authorisation from the top (2020). Medical staff faced punishment for warning about the disease, 
and as a result no new cases were reported for almost two weeks from January 5th. 
 
Fast forward to January the 10th 2020, The Fudan University in Shanghai published via the 
World Health Organisation their findings of the new virus being in the same family as the SARS 
coronavirus.3 On the 12th of January, the WHO declared, being "reassured" by the quality of 
the ongoing investigations that "the government reports that there is no clear evidence that the 
virus passes from person to person" (World Health Organization 2020a). However, things 
quickly escalated, and as President Xi made his first public comment on the virus on January 
the 20th, he stressed that it needed to be taken seriously (Associated Press 2020). Chinese 
epidemiologist Dr. Zhong Nanshan announced that the virus was indeed transmissible from 
 
1 The preference is throughout the paper to use the capitalized version: “COVID-19” when writing about the 
coronavirus, rather than “COVID-19” or “COVID-19”. This is consistent with the World Health Organization`s 
use of the abbreviation and its use in scientific papers (World Health Organization 2020d). 
2 MacQueen, Farache and Grigore argue that once the virus was first identified in late November 2019, Chinese 
doctors denied and supressed information about the virus for at least three weeks (2020, 285). 
3 SARS is short for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. It was first identified during an outbreak emerging in 
China in 2003, that spread to 4 other countries. The SARS virus is airborne and can spread through small 
droplets of saliva in a similar way as a cold or an influenza. It can also spread indirectly via surfaces that have 





person to person (McQueen, Farache and Grigore 2020, 286). Just three days later, on January 
23rd Wuhan was set under tight absolute lockdown suspending all public transport and air links 
out of the city (McQueen, Farache and Grigore 2020, 286).  
After the initial spread in Wuhan and China, the outbreak quickly spread across the globe the 
first months of 2020 (The Visual and Data Journalism Team 2020). Italy was hit first in Europe 
with what became a very grave impact (Spinelli and Pellino 2020, 785).  
 
1.2 Introducing the thesis  
"When the history of the COVID-19 pandemic is written, it will be possible to identify many 
individual decisions by politicians that influenced its course" (McKee et al. 2020, 2). The 
International press have given Brazil, a country populated by more than 210 million people, 
much attention during the COVID-19 pandemic. The spotlight is often on the well-known 
populist President: Jair Bolsonaro who has dealt with the pandemic by denying its seriousness 
and downplaying the necessity to impose preventive measures to avoid spread. This makes the 
question: How have populist governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis? 
Populism and crisis management  is what the thesis aims at shedding light on, as I will study 
Brazil and Bolsonaro´s COVID-19 response. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is frequently described as the gravest and most comprehensive public 
health crisis the world has faced in the past century (Bol et al. 2020; Lasco 2020, 1417; Toshkov, 
Yesilkagit and Caroll 2020).4 And as the virus has evolved and been spread leaving no continent 
untouched, it has affected every part of social and political life. When the World Health 
Organization declared COVID-19 to be a pandemic on March the 11th of 2020 (Al-Dabbagh 
2020, 1-2) governments all over the world were facing an immense challenge putting their 
institutional, organizational, and political structures to a great test. We can only imagine the 
limitless consequences the pandemic will have in the years that will follow on the economy, 
health and also the way states are governed and the way we perceive power. While containment 
measures were implemented to a varying degree in terms of effectiveness and strictness, Østebø 
 
4 “COVID-19 is a disease caused by a new strain of coronavirus. “CO” stands for corona, “VI” for virus, and 
“D” for disease. Formerly, this disease was referred to as “2019 novel coronavirus” or “2019-nCoV”. The 
COVID-19 virus is a new virus linked to the same family of viruses as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 





and Bye argue that COVID-19 may still prove to have a long-lasting effect in Latin America 
(2020, 2). Being already marked by economic disarray and political instability (Østebø and Bye 
2020, 2) Latin America was declared the epicentre of the pandemic by WHO on May 26th, 
2020 (Reuters 2020). Latin America is still the epicentre in June 2021 (Osborn 2021). 
Projections suggest that Latin American economies will be among the most affected by the halt 
in global trade and consumption caused by the pandemic. In many of the Latin American 
countries, the pandemic has put a stop to democratic processes such as scheduled elections in 
Bolivia and plebiscite in Chile. In federal Brazil, the central government's handling of the crisis 
has been a definite contribution to a severe political crisis (Østebø and Bye 20202, 2).  
From the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Brazilian President Jairo Bolsonaro 
encouraged people to gather and protest against the containment measures such as social 
isolation, asking people to break the rules set by for example governors. Bolsonaro also 
frequently claiming that the reactions and measures are taken globally and by Brazilian 
governors were unnecessary (McQueen, Farache and Grigore 2020, 296).  
Why study populist regime's response to COVID-19? 
"There appears to be a striking correlation between countries led by politicians who support 
populist messages and poor performance in responding to COVID-19" (McKee et al. 2020, 1). 
McKee et al. argue in his "Are Populist Leaders Creating the Conditions for the Spread of 
COVID-19?" from July 2020 that it appears clear how some political leaders have performed 
much better than others (1). By exemplifying with among others Brazil, McKee et al. 
furthermore argue that populist leaders are among those who have performed worst, as they 
tend to: "blame "others" for the pandemic, such as immigrants and the Chinese government; 
deny evidence and show contempt for institutions that generate it; and portray themselves as 
the voice of the common people against an out-of-touch elite" (2020, 1). Finally, McKee et al. 
find that populist leaders appear to undermine an effective response to COVID-19, which in 
turn may secure the populist leader's political gain as history has shown how populist leaders 
can benefit from suffering and ill health (2020, 1). 
Kavakli argues that: "When designing public policies against a pandemic, policymakers have 





(2020, 3). In 2020 several highly populated and large countries in the Americas were led by 
populists. Both in the case of The United States of America, Brazil, and Mexico.  
My motivation to look more closely at how governments in Latin America have meet COVID-
19 is the impact the virus will have on our societies in the time that follows. We need to learn 
more about the effectiveness of handling a crisis like COVID-19. The pandemic is not the first 
nor will it be the last to emerge and challenge our ways of ruling and managing states and 
nations. As Gerring states "Social science is a species of practical knowledge (..) if social 
scientists cannot tell us something useful about the world, then they (we) are serving very little 
purpose at all" (2012, 69). By Gerring's words, this study aims at providing useful information 
on important and impactful aspects of our society: how have populist governments responded 
to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis?  
1.3 Research question 
The topic is based on political behaviour, specifical populism in an extreme form and a new 
COVID-19 twist. I seek to shed light on populist government actions in response to COVID-
19. My research question is: How have populist governments responded to the COVID-19 
pandemic crisis? Given that my case is Brazil, I have formulated a more specific sub-question 
to limit and clarify: Which features characterise Bolsonaro's populism and how do these 
features become evident during a pandemic?  
My reason and motivation to study Bolsonaro and his managing during COVID-19 in Brazil is 
largely based on pure curiosity and a genuine will to understand just what kind of impact his 
populist take have had on COVID-19. Brazil is a diverse country both in terms of population 
and geography, and much is at stake at the hands of one person: Bolsonaro.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
From start till finish, the main aim of this study and thus this thesis will be to shed light on 
Bolsonaro, being a populist, and his response to COVID-19 in Brazil, answering my posed 
research question: How have populist governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic 
crisis? And the sub-question: Which features characterise Bolsonaro's populism and how do 





The first chapter paves the way for the thesis by introducing, clarifying, and informing on what 
to expect of the thesis in the sense of content and aim. The introduction includes a short section 
on background, providing some perspective on where the relevant literature stands and some 
circumstantial understanding of the evidence to come. The second chapter is dedicated to a 
thorough theoretical framework, assessing and considering the relevant literature, theoretical 
perspectives, and arguments on why the posed research question at hand is relevant. Once the 
theoretical framework is laid down, the applied methodological approach is explained and 
argued for in the third chapter. The methodological understanding is followed by the empirical 
analysis starting with a descriptive section of the case, before several analytical sections of the 
overall analysis are presented, discussed, and considered. The thesis is ended with a last chapter 
on concluding remarks, including findings, thoughts, and the road ahead for populism research.  
 
1.5 Previous findings in the literature 
In his "Did Populist Leaders Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic More Slowly? Evidence 
from a Global Sample", Kerim Can Kavakli (2020, 2) argues that there is a large literature on 
the effects of ideology regarding the management of public health. However, there are very few 
systematic studies on how ideology has shaped country responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The contribution provided by Kavakli brings forth the first analysis on the relationship between 
government ideology and different responses to the COVID-19 pandemic using new and up-
to-date data on government ideology for a large sample of countries (Kavakli 2020, 3).  
As COVID-19 is a recent phenomenon to be happening, there are not abounding studies on 
COVID-19 within comparative politics. Nevertheless, there are some important exceptions. 
Among others, the contributions by Frey, Chen, and President (2020); Kavakli (2020) as well 
as Tashkov, Yesilkagit and Carroll (2020) are noticeable. Frey, Chen, and President (2020) 
investigate determinants of state responses to COVID-19 by focusing on a country`s regime 
type (level of democracy). Kavakli (2020) looks into the determinants of state responses to 
COVID-19 by studying the government ideology, both economic and populist ideology. As for 






In addition to the mentioned studies, the contribution from McKee et al. (2020) also provides 
interesting insight. McKee et al (2020) categorize four potential mechanisms of populism and 
COVID-19 spread: blaming outsiders and victims, contempt for institutions, denialism, 
suspicion of elites. I will return to these mechanisms for further attention.  
 
1.6 COVID-19 in Latin America 
Given how new a phenomena COVID-19 is, the pandemic is not something thoroughly 
examined in scientific studies, which limits what certain knowledge we can understand about 
the pandemic. What we however can say, is that the pandemic may be viewed as a phenomenon 
that enhances already existing challenges in a society, such as inequality and uneven access to 
health and financial security: 
The pandemic is exposing and intensifying deep pre-existing and intersecting structures 
of inequality across geographical scales, as lesser developed countries and marginalized 
communities are hardest hit by both the health crisis and the cascading economic crisis 
and will have the most difficult road to recovery in its aftermath  (Finn, Pope and Sarduy 
2020, 167).  






Included in figure 1.1 are ten countries with the highest number of cases, through December 
31st, 2020. Based on publicly available data from the World Health Organization (2020f). 
In the case of Latin America, scholars argue that COVID-19 may still prove to have a long-
lasting effect in the region given it being already marked by economic disarray and political 
instability (Østebø and Bye 2020, 2). Latin America still is and has been the epicentre of the 
pandemic since 26th, 2020 (Boadle 2020; Osborn 2021). The economic projections suggest that 
Latin American economies will be among the most affected by the halt in global trade and 
consumption caused by the pandemic. What these numbers indicate is the size of the 
consequences we will be facing in the time to come. Unprecedented drop-offs in the important 
tourist industry have already been affecting the national economics throughout the Caribbean 
(Gaffney and Eeckels 2020, 308). Several pre-existing critical situations and crisis have eroded 
due to the additional "pressure" COVID-19 have resulted in.  
 
This is the case for the humanitarian situation at the U.S-Mexico border (Slack and Heyman 
2020, 334) and the crisis at the Colombia-Venezuela borderland (Idler and Hochmüller 2020, 
280). Furthermore, the challenge of climate change, neo-colonialism (Declet-Barreto 2020) as 
well as the indigenous populations across the region and their ill-treatment and absence of being 
prioritized (Abizaid, Panduro and Egusquiza 2020, 202). The different approaches taken by the 
different governments in Latin America have been ranging from denialism and conspiracy 
theory to economic opportunism and disaster capitalism, to international medical solidarity, to 
coordinated health and political effort with positive outcomes (Finn, Pope and Sarduy 2020, 
173). In Latin America, religious institutions have played an important role by contributing to 
maintaining social distancing and quarantine, however, in other cases, religious institutions 











2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In the following chapter, I lay down the theoretical framework for this study. Firstly, key 
concepts will be presented which will be followed by a revision of the relevant and central 
literature. There are mainly two schools of thought on populism, which will both be accounted 
for. The two different schools are The Ideational Approach and The Essex School. Both 
consider populism to be a form of resistance or oppositional politics with the potential to pose 
a serious challenge to the status quo (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 19). My theoretical argument 
for which school of thought I wish to focus on, will presented lastly.  
 
2.1 Understanding populism  
Populism is a contested element, understood in different ways. The following sections will 
account for some of the different views and aim at shedding light on what populism is, the 
different schools of thoughts and how they differ. 
2.1.1 What is populism?  
"Populism is among the most widely used but poorly understood political concepts of our time" 
(Taggart 2002, 62). Populism is understood as a system of beliefs that underlines actions of 
political agents, structured around a vertical down/up axis referring to power, representing some 
sort of "underdog". Populism is also understood as a strategy and may be used as a strategy to 
gain power, and parties once in power may not remain "as" populist as first assumed (De Cleen, 
Glynos and Mondo 2018, 652). Similarly, Weyland state that populism may be used as a 
strategy to attract voters and to maintain their support (2001, 14). The core to answering what 
populism is seems to be the us-them/elite-the people/up-down aspect. Kurt Weyland (1999, 
381-384) argues that populism is when a leader addresses a heterogeneous mass who is ready 
to be mobilized, that feels excluded, and that the populist interacts directly and personally, using 
his/her party or apparatus as a personal instrument or vehicle. "Populism" is a concept with 
different interpretations and scholars disagree on how useful the concept is, and what meaning 
it has. Yet there seem to be disagreements on what constitutes populism. This chapter is 
dedicated to giving insight on what populism is, and debate around the different ways of 





Scholar Juan Grigera presents a critique of how the term "populism" or a "populist" have been 
used in a Latin American context. He presents the claim that the term has been used to describe 
almost any government, even neoliberal ones from the 1990s: "This has been reproduced in the 
academic context, sometimes making the analytical value of the concept worthless" (Grigera 
2017, 442). Kurt Weyland on the other hand presents what he portrays as a clarification of a 
contested concept in his "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin 
American politics" (2001). Weyland argues that "many scholars regard populism as a useful, 
even indispensable, concept in elucidating Latin American politics" (2001, 1). In addition to 
that, Weyland state that populism may be used as a strategy to attract voters and to maintain 
their support (2001, 14). Furthermore, the notion that populism research is facing a fundamental 
challenge in the need to seriously reflect on the language games developed around the 
ideological uses of "populism" within academic and media discourse, is being raised in the 
literature (Stavrakakis 2017, 526).  
The existing theory problematises both the state of the current research on populism, as well as 
the content and priorities that have been made in studying the phenomena of populism. 
Populism is viewed as a phenomenon violating or transgressing an established order of how 
politics is properly, rationally, and professionally done (Stavrakakis 2017, 542). The American 
historian Comer Vann Woodward argues, by summing up the debate on American populism 
from 1950 throughout the 1970s, stating that "Populism" is understood as an incarnation of 
whatever violated the established order of things has been popularized through mainstream 
media and shared by political and academic (since the 1950s) (Stavrakakis 2017, 542). Another 
critique of populism studies is that much of the debate on populism suffers from a bias and that 
we need to question the dominant euro-centric approaches and reconsider our understanding of 
democratic political subjectivity in times of crisis (Stavrakakis 2017, 526). 
Stavrakakis being a considerable scholar with several impactful publications on populism, 
makes the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism: "in inclusionary 
populism, "the people" operates as a fluid "empty signifier" without a fixed signified, while in 
exclusionary populism it usually refers back to a phantasmatic transcendental signified, (the 
nation, race, etc.)" (2017, 530). Stavrakakis furthermore argues that inclusive populism creates 
a political space arranged mostly vertically (up/down, high/low), contrary to exclusionary 





2.1.2 Two different main approaches to populism  
As we now have a better understanding of what populism is as a whole, I in the following 
section, I examine the two main different ways of perceiving populism. The section is therefore 
dedicated to the two different school of thoughts on populism. The "Did somebody say 
populism? Towards a renewal and reorientation of populism studies" by Jonathan Dean and 
Bice Maiguashca from 2020 will be used as a path of thought throughout this literature review. 
The Essex School, as well as The Ideational Approach, are what I consider to be the two 
dominant schools of thought within populism research In this part of the thesis, I further 
examine the existing literature on populism.  
 
THE ESSEX SCHOOL  
The first school of thought that I wish to give attention to, is brought to us by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987a; Laclau and Mouffe, 1987b). With their 
discourse theory, the so-called Essex School, have influenced the mainstream section of 
populism research (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 306). Discourse theory has played an 
important role in studying populism, and especially in the UK and European perspective have 
Mouffe and Laclau been made use of by scholars. The Essex school of discourse theory 
emerged mainly from Laulau’s On Populist Reason published in 2005, in addition to the 
attendant themes (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 17). Noticeable thinkers working within the 
Laclauian tradition include (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017; Mouffe 2005; Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis 2014; Thomassen 2015). 
Populism is a dichotomic discourse in which "the people" are juxtaposed to "the elite" 
along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which "the people" is discursively 
constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to "the elite" conceived as a 
small and illegitimately powerful group. Populist politics thus claim to represent "the 
people" against an "elite" that frustrates their legitimate demands and presents these 
demands as expressions of the will of "the people" (2017, 306).  
Challenging conceptualisations of populism builds on a discourse- theoretical definition, which 
emphasizes how populism, through discourse constructs "the people" through an antagonistic 





theoretical perspective, popular politics is being organised by a particular political logic, which 
Glynos and Howarth argue is being constructed and named by the analyst (2007, 136). Looking 
at populism with this in mind, imply identifying how populism is used to interpellated and 
mobilise subjects, to formulate demand and contest existing regimes or underpin power 
relations (Glynos 2008, 278). A noticeable aspect existing literature on populism emphasizes 
is the special structure of "down/up", dominantly mentioned as a "basic" when understanding 
and studying populism. Is it useful in the sense that it allows for a distinction between 
populism's appeal and other discourses and their appeals, such as nationalism (Canovan 2005; 
Demertzis 2006; Mény and Surel 2000). By exemplifying with nationalism and populism, 
populism aiming at "the people" as the underdog compared to "the elite" raised above the people, 
nationalists focus on the love for "the nation" and the content for "the national other" (De Cleen 
and Stavrakakis 2017, 312).  
 
THIN IDEOLOGY – THE IDEATIONAL APPROACH  
The second school of thought is referring to populism as "thin ideology", named the Ideational 
approach.5 Is impossible to write about populism without mentioning Cas Mudde, who often 
appears along with his co-author Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, who: "constitutes the most 
widely cited body of work on contemporary populism" (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 13). 
Despite that the meaning of populism has been highly contested (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 
382) the ideational approach (that I hereby will refer to this approach as) is thriving on a long 
list of scholars who make use of it as their key starting point (Gerodimos 2015; Kessel 2015; 
March 2007; Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Pappas and Kriesi 2015; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2015; 
Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Stanley 2008). At the core of the ideational approach lies the way 
they define populism concerning ideology: 
populism is best defined as a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people 
and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté general (general will) of the people (Mudde 2005, 543).  
 
5 The term «ideational» is a relatively new term, designed to “smooth over differences among competing 





Deriving from this, we may understand populism as a "mental map" being accompanied by 
particular discourses making people understand the world and articulate their grievances and 
aspirations (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 7). Dean and Maiguashca understand Mudde and 
Kaltwasser`s ideas to stem from a political determination and moral judgement that the well-
being of "the people" is being trammelled by the special interests of a "corrupt elite", and that 
populism "embodies a defensive politics seeking to reclaim the putative rights of the common 
people, treated as a unified sovereign entity, against the demands and injunctions of an 
unaccountable ruling cadre" (2020, 13). Mudde and Kaltwasser understand populism as 
something that is showing signs of anti-establishment and that is justifying practices and/or 
policies that seek to appeal to the general will of the people, like plebiscites, and that respond 
to their "common sense" (2013, 15). The core concepts are simply put; the "pure people", the 
"corrupt elite" and "general will". And therefore, this thin ideology as the core feature and a 
name of this school of thought becomes a real-world phenomenon only when combined with 
thicker and more established "host" ideologies such as nationalism or socialism (Dean and 
Maiguashca 2020, 13).  
In contrast to the Essex school, the ideational approach takes a positivist approach to explain 
populism`s causes and consequences, aiming at holding an objective understanding by using an 
array of tools from mainstream political science (Hawkins 2019, 57).  
A more empirical view of the ideational approach puts it in an interesting perspective. When 
the approach is applied to real-world cases, we might see populism as driven by the passionate 
exhortations and gestures of high-profile leaders for example Hugo Chavez, Marine Le Pen, 
Jorg Haider (Jagers and Walgrave 2007, 319-345; Mudde 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 
147-174). Such leaders are typically presented as strong and enterprising (Dean and 
Maiguashca 2020, 13) however Mudde argues that regardless of charismatic leaderships 
frequently being present when describing populist politics, the fact that the leadership is 
charismatic is not a necessary component of populism, as one might often think or regard 
without further question (Mudde 2005, 556). According to the logic of the ideational approach, 
populism is a phenomenon constructed through a hierarchical relationship between the political 
elite/leaders, and "the people". In the ideational approach, "the people" is characterised as 





groups, by stating that latent populist followers need to be mobilized by populist actors, instead 
of taking initiative themselves (Mudde 2005, 548).  
 
2.1.3 Assessing of the two different approaches to populism 
To say the obvious, populism by Laclauian tradition (The Essex School) as opposed to those 
committed to Mudde`s understanding (The Ideational Approach), is differently proposed. The 
latter tradition on its hand practices an ontic vision.6 This means that they analyse politics which 
sees it as an already constituted terrain whose meaning and direction can be objectively 
measured and mapped which might even be predicted with sufficient conceptual tools (Dean 
and Maiguashca 2020, 18). On the other hand, the Laclauian tradition views politics as a more 
ongoing, unpredictable, and contingent play of difference. As game-defining fixed meanings 
which thus cannot be studied as an already constituted entity. 
 
And although it is true that the interplay and tension between these two ontological 
logics of the political are galvanized and sustained through the concrete discursive 
actions (which include words, symbols and practices) of both charismatic leaders and 
grass-roots mobilizations, the trajectory and fate of any populist moment is not 
reducible to them, dependent as it is on a range of discursive contestations and 
contingent events that far exceed the intentions of individuals (Dean and Maiguashca 
2020, 18). 
 
THREE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHTS 
We may map out three main differences between the two schools of thought discussed. (1) 
Firstly, the Essex school more often consider populism to benefit the democracy and is as a 
school of thought more normative than the ideational approach (Hawkins 2019, 65). By 
referring to Mouffe (1999) and Laclau and Mouffe (2004), Hawkins argues that scholars of the 
Essex school view populism: "as the most practical means of achieving the subjective 
transformation of workers into a unified social class, arguing that it reflects a healthier 
 
6 Ontic describes what is physical, real, or factually existing. In contrast, “ontological” (which is an adjective) 
describes what an entity is, whilst “ontic” (which is an adjective) describes whatever empirical knowledge that 





"agnostics" form of democratic politics that facilitates the institutional transformation 
demanded by the radical project" (2019, 65). This difference in outlook on populism is a major 
difference between the two schools. On one hand, scholars of the ideational approach tend to 
take a more clinical approach when studying populism, they also view populism as a force 
leading to violation of liberal democratic principles frequently.  
Whilst, on the other hand, the scholas of the Essex school are often critical both to social 
sciences as an objective enterprise as well as being more likely to embrace an activist model of 
scholarship (Hawkins 2019, 65). 2) The second difference between the two approaches is their 
actual object of study and how they consider it to operate. Both schools argue for populism 
being a type of ideas different from ideology in it not consciously elaborating. However, the 
ideational approach collects more inspiration from a traditional and positivist point of view 
which makes it treat ideas as something exogenous or given, and its existence or rebirth is 
viewed as neither mysterious nor problematic (Hawkins 2019, 65). The Essex school is in 
contrast "sees these ideas as a larger matrix of cultures that shapes our social roles and evolves 
with other ideas and our material environment” (Hawkins 2019, 65). This is in line with a more 
Althusserian approach (Hawkins 2019, 65).7 Therefore, the Essex school is considered to place 
more focus on the discursive dimension of populism, as opposed to the content of populist ideas. 
The Essex school view populist ideas to be created by political leaders, and their empirical 
research is mainly qualitative showing the creation and interplay of populist frames in mass and 
elite language (Hawkins 2019, 66). 
(3) The third and final main differentiation of the two schools that will be given notice here, is 
how scholars of the Essex school tend to be more restrictive in what historical movements or 
parties they label as populist, whiles the Ideational approach has a broader understanding of 
populism in a historical perspective (Hawkins 2019, 66). Ideational scholars characteries both 
left-wing and right-wing forces, including niche parties and failed movements, the Essex school 
 
7 The French philosopher Louis Althusser argues that ideology has a profound relationship with subjective 
experience. Althusser viewed the practises and beliefs inherent to ideology produce a sense of identity (Ryder 
2015). Laclau and Mouffe have been highly inspired by Althusser and Michel Foucault when theorising how 
discourses offer citizens particular subject positions to identify with, as well as how the process of being 





typically give the populist label to radical left-wing forces who are successful at reorienting 
masse identities and who gain political control (Hawkins 2019, 66). 
 
CRITIQUE OF THE ESSEX SCHOOL 
Scholars point to several limitations to The Essex school`s approach to populism. Among others, 
the Essex School is being accused of conceptual conflation (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 18). 
Benjamin Arditi (2004, 140) claims that Laclau vacillates between an ontological and ontic 
conception of populism. Furthermore, if choosing to ignore this conceptual shrinkage for a 
moment, there is also the issue of the notion of populism as a manifestation of counter-
hegemony as is suggested in The Essex School tradition that all oppositional or radical politics 
must be conceived as populist in nature. This is problematic, because if this is taken literally 
then populism loses any specificity of its own and becomes yet a different way of characterizing 
radical politics of all persuasions (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 18).  
Given that Laclau thought of "populist reason" as constituted by a logic of the political, we may 
imagine that this trade-off is acceptable to Laclau despite not being what contemporary scholars 
using the term wish to imply (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 18). Deriving from that notion, it is 
argued that populism in the understanding of the Essex School is most often used to identify 
and defend a politic of the political left being oriented in plural, inclusive and egalitarian 
manner. Scholar Janis Stavrakakis (with others) (2017, 2018, 2020) has belonged to the Essex 
School, and Stavrakakis has not followed suit but argued that right-wing movements cannot be 
considered populist because the key point in their discourses revolve around the "nation" or 
"ethnicity" as opposed to "the people", regardless of Laclau who made it clear that what he 
referred to as the "ontic contents" of populism could never be predetermined and was open to 
articulatory practices from both the right and the left (Stavkrakakis et al. 2017, 420-439). Dean 
and Maiguashca encourage us to look for, as well as to make a distinction, between right and 
left radical politics. Dean and Maiguashca furthermore argue that this aspect is obscured in the 
ideational approach where it does not receive as much explicit focus, furthermore this Essex 
School aspect of distinction "does not help us go much beyond this point when it comes to 
determining the specificity of populism concerning other instantiations of oppositional politics" 





A different yet related critique describing a tendency that damages the work of those scholars 
working in the Essex School according to Dean and Maiguashca is that the course of its 
operationalization the type of populism tends to first transform from a political logic to 
discourse and then to a series of rhetorical devices and utterances (2020, 18). Dean and 
Maiguashca (2020, 18) argue that this is the case, despite that Laclau emphatically and 
explicitly reject the idea to blend "discourse" with either language or ideology (Laclau 2005, 
68). As evidence to this phenomenon, Dean and Maiguashca (2020, 19) point to how scholars 
of the Essex School tradition Stavrakakis and Katsambekis reduce the analysis of left-wing 
populism in Greece to overt references to "the people", in the discourses of the Greek party 
Syriza (Stavrakakis 2015, 273-280; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 119-142). 
CRITIQUE OF THE THIN IDIOLOGY- THE IDEATIONAL APPROACH 
Mudde and his "thin ideology" definition of populism, strongly resembles the discourse-
theoretical definition in its minimal character (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 311), and the 
approach that is described by Rooduijn is used by a wide variety of political scientists (2014, 
582). However, there are still several aspects of the ideational approach, that have been 
criticised in the academic literature. Mainly conceptual and methodological problems with the 
ideational approach's concept of populism will be discussed in detail in the following section.  
Firstly, the concern of the classification of populism as an ideology. Michael Freeden argues 
that the two concepts at the very core of the ideational approach; thin ideology, meet challenges 
when being put together. Freeden argues that "populism" has none of the necessary features of 
"ideology", regardless of being thin or thick (Freeden 2017, 3). Freeden describes populism as 
an "ideationally insubstantial fingerprint" (2017, 10). Dean and Maiguashca (2020, 13) build 
on Freeden's views and thoughts, adding that it should be acknowledged that the defining force 
shaping the content and form of populism is indeed the "secondary" or "host" ideology. Dean 
and Maiguashca state that it is this additional ideological understanding or characterisation of 
a regime or leader that defines "populist" purpose:  
whether it be mobilizing people to action, constructing a template to make sense of the 
world or providing the basis for a broad national agenda, it is the substantive ideological 





do all the work in sustaining it and provide most of the explanation about it (Dean and 
Maiguashca 2020, 13-14). 
Luke March made this argument regarding the British left politics and the propensity to label it 
populist (2017, 282-303). Leaving be the doubts and critique of the conceptual coherence of 
populism in the ideational approach, methodological challenges also deserve our attention. One 
challenge that Dean and Maiguashca lay out is how scholars studying populism tend to shift 
their focus from ideology to the discursive content of a leaders "political talk", this being easier 
traced, coded, and quantified (2020, 14). Scholars such as Jagers and Walgrave show example 
of doing so in their "populism as political communication style" from 2007 (319-45), as they 
keep looking for references to the "people" or the "elite". Kriesi and Pappas argue that the 
reasoning behind this discursive focus is that it is the only way to operationalize ideology 
without adding another theoretical element to the definition (2015, 5). However logical, specific, 
and user-friendly this approach might be given its lexical analysis, such a "minimal" definition 
of populism might pose problems given what (how much) it could hold. Stijn Van Kessel 
addresses what he calls "degreeism", by arguing that given this minimal approach to defining 
populism, populism can potentially be present everywhere in different degrees (2014, 99-118). 
A similar critique with "degreeism" has been raised and said to be present in the other school 
of thought (The Essex school) when assessing Laclau (Thomassen 2015, 170). 
Unless we can create and operationalize populism as a category "classifier" concept which 
serves to delimit a universe of populist actors (Kessel 2014, 100) it becomes less clear why we 
should give attention to populist actors whose actions represent an exceptional and enduring 
rendition of politics. These are problems emerging as the definition is minimal.  
In addition to identifying some problems related to the minimalist definition of populism, there 
are also theoretical branches of the ideational approach, that aim at concretizing populism as a 
distinct phenomenon of politics. Jan-Werner Müller and Takis Pappas state that populism 
should be understood as a form of "democratic illiberalism" and thus treated with caution (Dean 
and Maiguashca 2020, 14). In "What is populism?" Müllers describes populism as "a particular 
moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally 
pure and fully unified . . . people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some way morally 
inferior" (Müller 2016, 19-20). Dean and Maiguashca argue that Müller sits in the ideational 





beliefs and values giving meaning to a set of political practice (2020, 14). With similar features 
to Mudde's vision, Müller argues that populism is discovered by the manipulative self-
appointed leader who seeks to gain trust and to represent misguided and angry people. 
Additionally, Müller adds emphasis to how people in a populist regime are being pitted against 
each other in a good vs. evil narrative. Müller indeed does see moral outrage as one of the 
lynchpins of populism (2016, 39).  
Mudde and Müller share several similarities as we have seen, yet there are some aspects they 
disagree on. The most prominent feature where Müller differs from the ideational approach is 
when Müller insists on seeing anti-pluralism as a defining feature of populism, as opposed to 
Mudde who considers anti-elitism to be the core feature (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 15). 
Yet another interesting thought in the ideational approach, is the literature on populism as a 
form of protest politics. It is not uncommon for political protest movements or various types of 
protest politics to portray the elites as the main root of evil as populism have no monopoly on 
this feature. However, it is only populists who unapologetically praise the virtues of a "highly 
exclusionary identity politics" where the "true" people are presented as outsiders as a threat to 
the popular will (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 15). Now, this anti-pluralism has some implicit 
consequences, and scholars argue that anti-pluralism poses a greater danger to democracy as it 
facilitates not only an illiberal democracy but even an authoritarian regime (Müller 2016, 141). 
The scholarly debate on how populism is a form of illiberal democracy is also addressed by 
Pappas (2015). He argues that populism fails to fulfil what he characterises as the three most 
fundamental principles of political liberalism; The acknowledgement of multiple divisions in 
society, The need to try reconciling such divisions via negotiated agreements and political 
moderations, The commitment to the rule of law as the protection of all minority rights (Pappas 
2015). Explicitly connected to Mudde`s definition of populism, Pappas (2014a) in his Populist 
democracies: post-authoritarian Greece and post-communist Hungary from 2014 defines 
populism as a world view where society is divided into the good (the people) and the bad (the 
elite) which in turn generates politics prone to confrontation, polarization and "political 
extremism" (1-23). One of the major challenges this poses to democracy, Pappa argues by 
exemplifying with Syriza and previous Greek governments, is that there becomes a dangerous 





representation and diversity within a democracy are being discredited and ignored, Pappa states 
(2014, 8). 
Furthermore, a different interesting aspect of Pappas literature on populism is the emphasis he 
gives to "the people" in studying their role as sustaining populism. He does so, by point to that 
populism do tend to thrive in countries without tradition or history of liberal political culture, 
and as a consequence of that the people will be less able and willing to act according to the 
"public good". In that way, Pappa argues (again exemplifying with Greece) that the people lack 
"social capital" for them to act rationally (2014b, 40).  
Moreover, a different trajectory of thinking about populism exemplified by the work of Moffitt 
has emerged: preferring to conceptualize populism as a "style" of politics. Being understood as 
a distinct manner of representation in line with a "playbook", key features of this performance 
include the appeal to the people, an indictment of corrupt elites and a coarsening of political 
rhetoric Moffitt calls "bad manners", and an evocation of crisis securing the spotlight on the 
leader as he/she creates an urgent and crucial need for themselves and their political actions 
(Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 16; Moffitt 2016). Within the ideational approach, scholars have 
been disagreeing on some elements of Mudde's conceptualisation. 
Unlike Müller, yet similar to other scholars in the ideational approach, Moffitt argues that 
leaders choose to perform elements to a less extent with all of them embodying some of these 
features of populism at least some of the time (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 16). We might thus 
understand Moffitt as a scholar who indirectly is supporting the graded view of populism, as he 
argues that populism is an integral part of democratic politics with populism having both 
positive and negative democratic tendencies. Nevertheless, there is an understanding that 
populism is a fundamentally "opportunistic" approach to politics, whose only purpose is to gain 
power and therefore populism remains dangerous to any inclusive of the plural political project 
(Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 16). Mudde states that Moffitt`s arguments do not vary or build 
much further from or away from the ideational definition (Mudde 2017). 
My theoretical argument is based on the ideational approach which conceptualized populism 
as a thin ideology. In this approach, the two defining characteristics of populism are: (1) the 
idea that society is divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, which are the "pure 





general will of society. The ideational approach is in my view the currently dominant approach 
taken in research on populism. Given my research question and study of the Brazilian President 
Bolsonaro, the ideational approach with its emphasis on the rhetorical "pure people" vs. 
"corrupt elite" is fitting to my case. The Ideational approach is well suited for the empirical 
study of populism and crisis management.  Bolsonaro is known for rhetorical appealing to the 
masses, asking for support in a personalistic and direct way, saying things like "power is with 
the people" (Arcanjo 2020b, my translation). The logic of the Ideational Approach views the 
people as a group of populist followers who need to be mobilized by a populist actor (Mudde 
2005, 548).  The Ideational Approach considers right-wing politicians as populists as well as 
left-wing politicians, as opposed to the Essex school that traditionally only label left-wing 
politicians as populists. Furthermore, the Ideational approach puts emphasis on how a protest 
mass needs to be mobilized by a populist, not mobilize themselves. Therefore, adopting the 




I have now provided a better understanding of populism and how it can be perceived differently. 
These following sections are dedicated to the crisis concept, how it is understood and studied 
as a phenomenon in relation to handling by governments, what kind of crisis COVID-19 is, and 
which role populism can play in crisis management. “Major crises strike at the core of both 
democracy and governance. Crises constitute challenges not only for capacity but also for 
accountability, legitimacy, representation and citizens 'ability to get their demands met 
effectively” (Christensen and Lægreid 2020, 774).  
 
2.2.1  Ruling Governments when crisis hits  
How are governments supposed to react to a crisis? 
“Crises constitue an ambivalent concept. It originates from ancient Greek medical and juridical 
discourses” (Koselleck 1988, 103). Historically, "crisis" has signified both a critical 
conjuncture (a meaning emanating from medical discourse) and a final judgment (a sense 
originating from the juridical field). Closer to our time, moving into the 20th century, the Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci became the first to capture the representation/discursive dimension 





open character of the outcomes of the crisis. Namely formulating that crisis "consists precisely 
in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born" (Gramasci 1971, 276). More 
recently within the field of political science, Colin Hay has further developed the characteristics 
and conceptual understanding of "crisis" (Stavrakakis et al. 2018, 7). Hay show signs of 
similarity to Kosseleck and provide the cohabitation of two distinct dimensions. "That of 
objective constriction leading a given system into a phase of instability with unpredictable 
consequences, on the one hand, and that of subjective intervention which signifies and 
represents this instability in particular ways" (Stavrakakis et al. 2018, 7). In relation to the case 
of this study, we may see COVID-19 as a phase of instability with unpredictable consequences, 
and populism something subjective which might intervene and possibly represent instability.  
Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja provide us with the notion that crisis management is a core 
government responsibility that is challenging to fulfil (2016, 887). A crisis might give rise to 
various types of challenges for public administration, depending on the nature of the crisis. 
Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja argue that a general theory of how crises should be managed 
and by what type of organizations do not exist, and therefore it becomes necessary to distinguish 
among various types of crises (2016, 888). Furthermore, they argue that many crises are 
categorized by their causes, yet two other dimensions are crucial. First the degree of uncertainty 
and uniqueness of the crisis, and second the degree of transboundary features (Christensen, 
Lægreid and Rykkja 2016, 888). Building on that, we understand that "the most demanding 
crises are those that transcend administrative levels, sectors, and ministerial areas and at the 
same time are unique, ambiguous, complex and involve a lot of uncertainty" (Christensen, 
Lægreid and Rykkja 2016, 888). 
 
2.2.2  The COVID-19 crisis 
What kind of crisis is COVID-19?  
“Dealing with crises means dealing with nightmares and nightmares become less of a threat if 
someone turn on the light. Classifying crises is the first step to keep them under control since 
they can be named and analysed.” (Gundel 2005, 106). The presumably oldest and most 
common typology distinguishes between man-made (technological) and natural crisis 





attribute being fulfilled or not. For example, the distinction of whether the crisis is national or 
international, episodic or continuous crisis management (Gundel 2005, 108). 
Despite the fact that COVID-19 is mostly being referred to as a health crisis, the COVID-19 is 
more than a health crisis. According to Hay (1996, 255) The pandemic is read as a health 
governance "crisis", as the policy and political responses to the COVID-19 public health threat 
evoke state power described as "the ability to identify, define and constitute crises". Also cited 
by (Walby 2015, 17; Vieten 2020, 7). Given the insight from what has been made an account 
for in this section, COVID-19 is regarded as a crisis.  
 
2.3 Populism and crisis  
 
With a better understanding of the crisis concept and having established that COVID-19 will 
be regarded as a crisis, the following sections will link together populism and crisis handling. 
 
2.3.1 COVID-19 crisis and populism  
Are populist regimes particularly vulnerable in terms of managing these types of crisis? 
Kavakli presents two important factors when aiming at understanding the link between 
government ideology and the state`s COVID-19 response (2020, 3). The first, according to 
Kavakli, is to which extent a given government trusts health experts when they are warning 
about how many lives are at risk (2020, 3). This might prove to be a challenging task, as in the 
initial stages of a crisis the costs of preventive measures like jobs at risk, are real, but the damage 
and deaths that will be prevented are based on experts' projections (Kavakli 2020, 3). The latter 
consequently presents a more abstract situation, simply put. Hence, if trust is low then the 
government distrusting the experts are more likely to discount the risk and resist calls to take 
strong measures (Kavakli 2020, 3-4).  
 
Now keeping this in mind, the string of thought takes us one step further by reflecting on how 
this distrust plays out within the different political ideologies. Given the explanation provided 
in section 2.1.1 on what constitutes populism, distrust toward elites is a defining feature of 
populism, and this distrust is naturally extended to distrust towards expertise. 





perceived and brought into existence through narrative and discourse. By looking at the 2008 
financial crisis, Walby argues that temporality is highly relevant, as the crisis is identified with 
rapture and a state of exemption. It thus contrasts with more "normal" times (2015, 18). "Crisis 
operates as a signifier of a malaise conveying cracks, change, instability and lack of good 
governance" (Vieten 2020, 7). In order to fully understand what kind of crisis COVID-19 is, as 
well as providing a greater understanding of the discursive construction of what is exposed as 
a crisis, we should look at how we talk of a crisis, and that calling something a crisis is a 
powerful tool in itself, by framing something. Vieten stresses that the negative connotation of 
the previous "migrant crisis" and this current "public health crisis" is embedded in the 
falsification of cause and consequence of governmentality (2020, 7). Hall et al. (1978, 322) on 
the other hand, argue that crisis in this context endangers the possibility of another "moral-panic 
cycle".  
A moral panic cycle refers to a situation where systemic crises are displaced 
ideologically via moral discourse aimed at placating social anxiety while, most 
importantly, prescribing the cause of the crisis itself as its solution . . . moral panic, 
often artfully turned into sour resentment, against usual suspects like the immigrants  
(Feldner 2014, 3). 
Citing Feldner, Vieten (2020, 8) argue that this moral panic serves as a delusion that distracts 
from the cause of a crisis. Widespread anxieties and xenophobia might spread in the public 
when there is absence of good governance and as political elites respond to the immediate 
pandemic in a failing manner (Vieten 2020, 8. Scholars such as Mudde (2017); DeAngelis 
(2003) argue that xenophobia: the fear of "the other" as well as the perception as "stranger", 
rather than racism is associated with far-right populism. Vieten (2020) argue that xenophobia 
can be mobilised in times of crises, also during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Vieten 
exemplifies this by mentioning the 2008 financial crisis as a symptom of "capitalism in crisis". 
Furthermore, Feldner (2014) argue that in the run-up to the Brexit referendum in 2016, 
immigration was rhetorically linked to a social welfare crisis. Vieten (2020) argue that in the 
context of the economic, social, and ecological global public health crisis as is to be seen as a 
result of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is a space of opportunity in the current 
COVID-19 situation. The potential of a delusion in addition to blurred boundaries of fact and 
fiction encompassing the reading of a crisis makes the COVID-19 situation exploitable to 





A different aspect that is necessary to address in relation to populism and COVID-19, is the 
media. Scholars who have studied populism, such as Jansen (2015); Zúquete (2015) and Mudde 
(2017) agree that populism is driven by a strong discontent towards elites. Now McKee et al. 
argue that populist politicians have a habit of positioning the media (particularly the fractions 
criticizing their politics or message) as members of the "corrupt elite" (2020, 3). Yet at the same 
time, experts need to rely on mainstream media platforms during the pandemic in order to 
generate public health awareness. It is this dynamic that creates an insidious pathway where 
populism may even facilitate the spread of COVID-19 (McKee et al. 2020, 3). A recent study 
showed findings on media consumption and COVID-19 conception found consuming 
mainstream media (such as NBC News and the New York Times) correlated with having 
accurate information about the lethality and protection from infection (Jamieson and Albarracín 
2020, 1). Furthermore, the study showed a correlation between watching Fox News and 
supporting conspiracy theories, such as believing that the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention is exaggerating the seriousness of COVID-19 to undermine the presidency of 
Donald Trump (Jamieson and Albarracín 2020, 1).  
 
2.4 How populism can affect COVID-19 Policy Response  
 
The fact is that we are currently facing what without exaggeration might be the worst global 
crisis of a generation. Hence, a discussion and critical reflection involving the role and 
prospects of populism is extremely important – even urgent (Stavrakakis and Katsampekis 2020, 
4). The relationship between "crisis" and populism have been a central topic in the relevant 
literature for several decades (Stavrakakis and Katsampekis 2020, 4). When Ernest Laclau 
published his Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism in 1977, 
this was one such contribution. Laclau state that some degree of crisis is a necessary 
precondition for populism, that populism cannot emerge without a crisis (175). Stavrakakis and 
Katsampekis argue that crisis is interesting in light of populism as a crisis operates as an 
opportune environment for the rise of populist actors (Stavrakakis and Katsampekis 2020, 4).  
Crisis usually designate moments that exaggerate socio-political divisions, create new  
rifts and potentially increase the distance between "people" and "elites", governments and the 
governed. In addition, populists themselves, in most cases, invoke and perform some notion of 





to unify and mobilise broader social strata against unresponsive political 'elites' that are 
rendered responsible for their troubles. Finally, such populist crisis narratives are not alone in 
the public sphere; they usually antagonise other, anti-populist crisis narratives, thus constituting 
a comprehensive analysis encompassing both camps a priority if one is to understand the socio-
political stakes in a given conjuncture (Stavrakakis and Katsampekis 2020, 4). 
 
2.4.1 Mechanisms of populism during COVID-19  
As a takeaway from the comparison of the two schools of thought and what key aspects they 
have in common, in addition to the literature review on populism, I chose to underline four 
traits that might contribute to defining populism. These traits can be viewed as mechanisms that 
may have an impact on COVID-19. The four traits appear as presented by McKee et al. (2020) 
In the chapter dedicated to the analysis, these traits (hereby referred to as "mechanisms") will 
be used as a tool in the analysis when looking into how populism has influenced policy in times 
of COVID-19 as well as how governments have responded to the crisis of COVID-19.  
I present the four mechanisms and discuss them, on the following pages. 
 
2.4.1.1   Mechanism (1): “Blaming Outsiders and Victims”  
McKee et al. argue that it becomes necessary to look at populism in a broad sense when aiming 
to understand responses to COVID-19. Albertazzi and McDonnell define populism as an 
ideology that “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous 
“others” who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people 
of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice” (2008, 3).8 Mudde emphasises that the 
group populist addresses as outsiders are often not outsiders at all, but the created narrative is 
sufficient for this (imagined) difference between groups in order to appeal (2004, 560).  
What can be achieved by using such a definition is that it will grasp over a larger sample. 
McKee and his fellow scholas exemplify with listing populists to the left such as Venezuela´s 
 
8 Albertazzi and McDonnell stresses that they understand ideology as a system of beliefs, values, and ideas 
characteristic of a particular group, as the authors have adapted this view from Williams (1977, 55). “Used in 
this way, the term refers to belief systems whose function is to explain why things are as they are by providing 
an interpretative framework through which individuals and/or organizations make sense of their own 





Nicolás Maduro as well as Brazil´s Jair Bolsonaro who is characterised to the right in addition 
to populists heavily influenced by nationalism or religion such as Turkey´s Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan or India´s Narendra Modi. The list may continue with names such as USA´s Donald 
Trump, Russia´s Vladimir Putin and UK`s Boris Johnson all adopting populist approaches 
(McKee et al. 2020, 2). What these political leaders have in common is that they have all 
adopted a (populist) approach where it is central to appeal to groups in society that have been 
left behind (Greer et al. 2017, 40). The form of neglect might be for various reasons including 
the consequences of loss of traditional industries and who have struggled to adapt to changing 
circumstances, often because of a lack of the necessary skills" (McKee et al. 2020, 2). As a 
room of opportunity opens populists exploit this search for someone to blame for the misfortune. 
Populist then may create a narrative where this misfortune is caused by the actions of a group - 
and this group who is being pointed out as the responsible for this misfortune are often 
identifiably different by for example by having a different skin colour (McKee et al. 2020, 2). 
Scholars Sandro Galea and Nason Maani exemplify by reminding us of how Donald Trump 
used COVID-19 as an excuse to justify the expansion of restrictions on workers coming from 
abroad (2020). We call this the "insider-outsider" narrative, and the populist leader enters this 
narrative as a strong leader who will save "his" people in addition to offering a better future 
which is, in turn, will matter little if they fail to achieve (McKee et al. 2020, 2). In this narrative, 
the populist leader is almost free of guilt – it does not matter if the promises fail and if they fail 
then it is always someone else´s fault (often those from the "other" group or the elite).  
Translating this in a COVID-19 context, the narrative meets difficulties when the "other" group 
who is often to blame for a (for example) deteriorating labour market, is indeed COVID-19 
being a microorganism that does not pay attention to national borders, passports, or citizenship. 
Nevertheless, this did not seem to stop President Trump from blaming what he referred to as a 
"Chinese" or "Kung Flu" virus in the same way as Hindu nationalist blamed Muslims (McKee 
et al. 2020, 2). 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MECHANISM (1): 
NOT IDENTIFYING THE CAUSES OF THE SPREAD BY WRONGFULL BLAMING  
As a consequence of blaming outsiders and victims, it becomes increasingly challenging to 
identify the actual causes of the pandemic and why it spreads. Instead of finding the cause, 





is more important. At the same time blaming outsiders and victims may also lead to an 
underestimation of the pandemic, and difficulty of seeing the real reasons why the virus is 
spreading. We cannot say for sure that these consequences can be expected, but theoretically, 
these may be theoretical consequences we might look for. 
 
2.4.1.2  Mechanism (2): “Contempt for Institutions” 
McKee et al. (2020, 2) identify two features of populism that are noticeable as they are inherent 
in populism and might have affected the steering wheel through COVID-19.  
The first feature is the contempt for elites and for traditional institutions that are populated by 
elites (McKee and Stuckler 2017, 669). Populist leaders tend to challenge and question 
institutional power and are reluctant to be bound by institutional constraints such as 
constitutions and courts (McKee et al. 2020, 2). This is well-founded in the classical literature 
on populism, as Mudde states how the discontent towards the elite as an expert group is a key 
feature to the ideational approach (2005, 243). Bugaric argues that populist tend to persistently 
attack legal institutions in liberal democracies (2021, 191). 
The second feature is populist's attitude towards public health institutions. Populist leaders tend 
to discredit, neglect, deny necessary funding and leave key positions unfilled within the public 
health intuitions (McKee et al. 2020, 2). Some empirical examples: The Trump administration 
shut down the USAID funded PREDICT programme, designed to provide early warning of 
possible pandemic just three months before COVID-19 (Milman 2020). In a similar manner, 
Brazil experienced their President Bolsonaro firing two health ministers within weeks (Phillips, 
2020a), and in 2017 India`s Narendra Modi cut the planned budget for the National Health 
Mission – India`s public health service by 20% (Kalra and Wilkes 2017). In The UK Boris 
Johnson removed the cabinet´s Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingency Committee just 
days after he took office (Telegraph Reporters 2020). The health system in Turkey was severely 
weakened as Recep Tayyip Erdogan dismissed tens of thousands of civil servants including 
leading virologist (Erdemir and Lechner 2020). 
 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MECHANISM (2): WOBBLY PANDEMIC RESPONSE 
 
As opposed to stable institutions a result of contempt for institutions are an unstable and 





unforeseen way. Also, time that could have been used to give a more efficient and sooner 
response to the pandemic may be wasted by arguing and fighting between the different 
institutions as they keep disagreeing. Theoretically, we may also find contradicting messages 
on COVID-19 going out to the public.  
 
2.4.1.3  Mechanism (3): “Denialism”  
 
Populists practice the art of denialism, as they reject evidence by being reluctant to be 
constrained by intuitions and their rules as well as rejecting the laws of science which are 
discovered and promoted by the elites (McKee et al. 2020, 2). Denialism includes populist 
promotion of conspiracy theories, cherry-picking evidence, citing false experts, moving 
goalposts, and employing a range of logical fallacy (Diethelm and McKee 2009, 2-3). Scholars 
of the ideational approach, Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 392) argue that populists will often deny 
the information experts present. 
This kind of denialism is a central aspect of populism and is at the core of understanding 
populists' approach to COVID-19. Boris Johnson advised the public that "we should all 
basically just go about our normal daily lives" in addition to washing their hands frequently and 
avoid shaking hands with infected patients, the prime minister said in March 2020 (Russell 
2020). Later in March Brazil`s Bolsonaro described the pandemic (which by then had accounted 
for just under 20 000 deaths worldwide) as a "media trick" (Phillips 2020b). Furthermore, 
Donald Trump and Nicolás Maduro agreed as they both were promoting a treatment that did 
not have any evidential basis like when they were suggesting the use of Hydroxychloroquine 
(Graham-Harrison, Ellis-Petersen and Burke 2020). 9  When Trump was challenged by the 
director of the US health department`s Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority on the support for the use of hydroxychloroquine, he was fired (Smith 2020b). In a 
White House press briefing on April 10th, 2020, Trump noted about the virus: "You know, it's 
a brilliant enemy. They develop drugs like the antibiotics. You see it. Antibiotics used to solve 
 
9. The World Health Organization have repeatedly said that hydroxychloroquine does not have clinical benefits 
in treating COVID-19. The hydroxychloroquine (or chloroquine as it is sometimes referred to) is “a treatment for 
malaria, lupus erythematosus, and rheumatoid arthritis, has been under study as a possible treatment for  
COVID-19 Current data shows that this drug does not reduce deaths among hospitalised COVID-19 patients, nor 






every problem. Now one of the biggest problems the world has is the germ has gotten so brilliant 
that the antibiotic can't keep up with it" (Brady 2020).  
The quantitative multi-country study performed and presented by Kavakli (2020) in his "Did 
populist Leaders Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic More Slowly? Evidence from a Global 
Sample" support McKee`s denialism. Kavakli analysis show support for the perception that 
populist leaders have mismanaged the COVID-19 crisis, after analysing 94 countries political 
leaders' response to COVID-19 (Kavakli 2020, 13-14). The findings suggest that governments 
headed by populist leaders delivered a weaker response to COVID-19 than non-populist ones 
by implementing fewer closures and less robust health countermeasures during the onset of the 
crisis (Kavakli 2020, 13-14). Kavakli`s study controlled for the effect of countries' economic 
capacity, demographic composition, earlier experience with pandemics such as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), the level of democracy, and time elapsed since the discovery of 
a country's first confirmed COVID-19 case (Kavakli 2020, 8-9).  
 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MECHANISM (3): DELAYED PANDEMIC RESPONSE  
 
When it comes to denialism, a possible consequence that we cannot say for sure that is expected, 
but theoretically may happen is how long it takes from the crisis occurred and till action is taken. 
Denialism may lead to a delay in response. Furthermore, denialism may cause a thug of war 
between institutions such as the ministry of health and the populist. Denialism can also result 
in less truthful and valuable information reaching the public. 
 
2.4.1.4  Mechanism (4): “Suspicion of Elites”  
The two central scholars on populism Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that populist politicians 
commonly describe the media (especially media that criticize their policies or messaging) as 
members of the "corrupt elite" (2017, 11-12). As "the elite" is a key concept in populism, 
populist politicians use morality as they distinguish between the pure people and the corrupt 
elite. The elite may refer to the economic elite, the cultural elite, and the media elite. These 
groups are seen as one whole group of corrupt members who not only have conflicting interests 






This elite is defined by their power and that they are often holding leading positions within 
politics, the economy, the media, and the arts. Populist themselves are excluded from this "rule", 
as well as those who are sympathetic to the populist (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 12). For 
populists who are in power, can be useful to link the elite to economic power as it can "explain" 
their lack of political success – that "they are sabotaged by the elite, who might have lost 
political power but who continue to hold economic power" (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 13).  
As the central distinction in populism is moral, populists choose from a variety of secondary 
criteria to distinguish between the people and the elite. In this way, populists enjoy great 
flexibility in defining whom to blame (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 16).  
 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MECHANISM (4): LOW MEASURE COMPLIANCE  
 
When a society is characterised by a suspicion of elites this can influence to what extent the 
public will comply with any imposed or suggested measure related to COVID-19. If the 
public has a suspicious and untrusty attitude towards the media, then this can affect massively 
as media are crucial in spreading information about the pandemic and the measures. What 
information and knowledge people absorb coming from the media might be influenced. We 
cannot say for sure that these consequences can be expected, but theoretically, these may be 
theoretical consequences we might look for. As politicians are steering society through crisis, 
it will be possible to identify many individual decisions made by politicians that have 
influenced the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Timing of the decisions to impose 
restrictions on movement is likely to be the most important decisions (McKee et al. 2020, 2). 
"Other will include choices about how and when to implement testing and tracing strategies, 
how message was communicated, how necessary material to respond to the pandemic was 










3.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
Several methodological alternatives are available to study governments' policy responses to 
COVID-19. This thesis performs a qualitative case study on the Brazilian Federal 
Government/The President/The Supreme Federal Court policy response to COVID-19, using a 
report issued by the Universidade de São Paulo (2021) and 6325 publications from the Brazilian 
newspaper Folha de São Paulo. To answer the posed research question: How have populist 
governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis?”, and my sub-question: Which 
features characterise Bolsonaro's populism and how do these features become evident during 
a pandemic?  I perform a case study of Brazil. In this chapter, I will explain the method of 
content analysis, case selection being the Brazilian President Bolsonaro: the extreme case, in 
addition to providing a brief comparative perspective on the case I have selected. Furthermore, 
this chapter will contain an account for the reliability and validity, weaknesses, and strengths 
of this study. 
 
 
3.1 Case study 
 
Choosing a research design should be based on what one seeks to achieve with the research 
(Gerring 2007a, 37). In addition to identify causal mechanisms leading to a certain outcome, I 
have four main aims for this study. Firstly, the aim is to describe COVID-19 in Brazil, a field 
that is under development and barely explored. Secondly, I seek to identify how Bolsonaro's 
populism has manifested itself during 2020. Third, I intend to analyse how Bolsonaro's 
populism during 2020 might have had implications on the course COVID-19 have taken in 
Brazil. Fourth and finally, the contribution aims at possibly make the foundation for further 
research generating new hypotheses.  
Since the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Brazil on the 26th of February 2020, the 
outbreak grew fast in all Brazilian states (Porsse et al. 2020, 1106). Brazil made headlines as it 
came to be the second most affected country worldwide,10 regarding confirmed cases and 
 
10 Data viewed on January 8th, 2021. On this point Brazil was the second most affected by deaths, only surpassed 
by The United States of America. By number of infected, Brazil was number 3 surpassed firstly by The United 






deaths according to data on the COVID-19 Dashboard provided by the Centre for Systems 
Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) (John Hopkins University 
of Medicine Coronavirus Resource Centre 2021).  
Yin (2014, 16) describe case studies as "An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth within its real-world context". Case studies are a convenient and useful 
research design when used to gain knowledge in a field there is relatively little knowledge on 
(Swanborn 2010, 41). And a case study on populisms effect on COVID-19 policy response 
would indeed result in potential knowledge in a field there has been relatively little research on 
due to its recent nature. Also, case studies are suited to shed light on phenomenon's by using 
"how"- and "why"- research questions (Gerring 2007a 187-210). Given that my research 
question: How have populist governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis? Is an 
investigative question that seeks to explain a "how", a case study will serve as a fitting choice 
of research design. A case study of a populist government's response to COVID-19 is a indebt 
study of a how mechanism, as opposed to a to what degree or how much which would be less 
suited for a case study research design. 
Furthermore, when considering a qualitative or a quantitative approach there were several 
reasons for rejecting the quantitative alternative. A case study on qualitative data is used to gain 
a detailed understanding of the mechanisms at play in Bolsonaro's handling of the pandemic. 
The study uses qualitative analysis to gain insights into how Bolsonaro has acted, performed, 
and responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil. The qualitative method is one of the more 
practical ways of looking into how Bolsonaro have handled the COVID-19 pandemic, as the 
data available are mainly qualitative. The research question also calls for a qualitative approach, 
as this study aims at answering a case question in depth. There surely would be advantages with 
adding a quantitative section or component to this study, but as for now, the aim is to answer a 
"how" question with a qualitative approach allowing to capture the complexities of the 
phenomenon.  
 
3.2 Selecting the Case  
 
Seawright and Gerring (2008, 296) define case study as "the intensive (qualitative or 





researcher ́s goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (a population of cases)". Case 
studies have many positive aspects to them as a research design. One main aspect is how case 
studies are good at evaluating the scope conditions of theories by assessing whether or how 
variable matters for a certain outcome, while on the other hand they rarely contribute to 
estimating how much a variable matter (George and Bennett 2005, 25-26).  
Literature on states response to COVID-19 frequently argues that Bolsonaro who is populist 
have mattered for the COVID-19 outcome in Brazil. Bieber (2020, 5) argue that populists Jair 
Bolsonaro have responded late and erratically to the crisis. Bolsonaro`s coalition has been 
described as a "loose populist coalition incorporating military officers, far-right YouTube 
pundits, Pentecostal clergy, and weakly organize group citizens – some of whom like to camp 
near the presidential palace in Brasília" (Smith 2020a, 81). Smith furthermore describes 
Bolsonaro as a "right-wing, authoritarian populist who is vocally enthusiastic about military 
interventions in democratic politics" (2020, 77). 
There are several good reasons why Brazil is a fitting case for a study of a populist's COVID-
19 crisis management. Firstly, Brazil experienced a real tough challenge battling some of the 
world's highest numbers of dead and infected by COVID-19 in 2020 (John Hopkins University 
of Medicine Coronavirus Resource Centre 2021). Secondly, Brazil`s policy response to 
COVID-19 has gained much attention as it made national and international headlines several 
times during the pandemic (Arias 2021; Gortázar 2020; Hecimovic, 2020; Londoño 2020; 
Londoño, Andreoni and Casado 2020; Phillips 2020c; Phillips 2020d; Phillips 2020e; Phillips 
and Barretto Briso 2020. While Brazilian state governors and several municipal mayors have 
had a policy response that included COVID-19 restrictions such as social isolation in mid-
March 2020, the tone of the President was different (Duarte 2020, 287). Bolsonaro downplayed 
the seriousness of the pandemic by accusing the governors and mayors of hysteria saying they 
exaggerated the coronavirus threat (Duarte 2020, 287). Thirdly, scholars widely agree (across 
schools of thoughts and disciplines) that Brazil's President Bolsonaro is to be characterised as 
a populist (Daly 2019; Hunter and Power 2018; Neto and Pimenta 2020).  
In addition to these listed arguments, the fact that in Brazil many prerequisite elements of 
choosing a scientific approach to the pandemic is present. Nevertheless, the country is led by a 
populist president. This argument makes Brazil a very interesting case to study COVID-19 and 





populist makes him an "extreme case" (Gerring 2007b, 101) which will be explained further in 
section 3.2.1. 
Brazil is the most populated country in South America with over 210 million inhabitants, as of 
2019 (Pasquali 2020). And in a Latin American context, Brazil may be described as a 
pioneering country in terms of its position in relation to its fellow Latin American neighbours. 
Love (2018, 863) argues that in comparison to the other Latin American countries, Brazil`s 
"government has the highest per capita and absolute spending on research and development". 
Furthermore, Melo and Pereira (2013, 11) stated that Brazil`s bureaucracy ranked first of twenty 
of the regions' nations according to the Inter-American Development Bank. In the years before 
2016, Alston et al. (2016, 130) stated that Brazil had had the highest social spending per capital, 
along with the highest government expenditure as a share of GDP. The expenditure matched 
OECD levels. Brazil is in many respects in the vanguard in Latin America.  
Returning to a central argument for choosing Brazil: Given how Brazil finds itself in the 
situation of possessing a large reporter of experts and expertise, one could argue that Brazil 
would indeed be least likely to have populism influence the pandemic handling. Brazil would 
be likely to follow a scientific approach when handling the COVID-19 pandemic. That 
Brazilian politicians would listen to advice from medical experts, health authorities and 
technocrats.  
My main reason for choosing Bolsonaro is how well he fits the category of extreme case. 
Bolsonaro being an extreme case is a central feature to this study as him being an extreme 
populist allows us to isolate the effect of populism on COVID-19 handling, because Brazil’s 
level of medical expertise and quality of institutions makes Brazil believed to perform similarly 
to a western country in handling COVID-19.  In addition to that, I wish to give a less important 
but still interesting observation on the case. In accordance with George and Bennett’s definition 
(2005, 121), I consider Brazil to be a least-likely case. We could have expected the country’s 
president to be following advice from the relevant experts.  In other words: several factors 
indicate that Brazil should be a least-likely case for a populist handling of the COVID-19 
pandemic (George and Bennett 2015, 121).  Brazil being least-likely adds an additional 
interesting layer to the case. Brazil is least likely to exhibit a given outcome: least likely to 
show that COVID-19 handling has been affected by populism: “In a least likely case, the 





posit an extreme outcome. Brazil, given its high levels of medical expertise, high levels of 
development relative to the region, and high quality of bureaucracy, would be likely to tackle 
COVID-19 with a scientific approach. Therefore, Brazil is a least-likely case to show that 
populism would impact the COVID-19 handling largely. While the fact that Bolsonaro is 
populist points to this study possibly revealing some smaller implications to the COVID-19 
handling, the other variables regarding state of the Brazilian institutions and medical expertise 
indicate that we will see small signs of populism influencing COIVD-19 handling.  In fact, 
several factors indicate that the country would be likely to follow expertise, resulting in an 
expert-oriented/ professionally based approach to COVID-19. Brazil should be as similar to a 
western country in its pandemic response as possible. With Bolsonaro being an extreme 
populist, and an extreme case, we establish for sure that we have a populist in the picture, 
potentially influencing COVID-19 handing in Brazil. 
 
Therefore, Brazil makes for a terrific case not only because the country is led by a populist 
president, but because studying the Brazilian case provides of an isolation of the effect of 
populism. If this study were to look at a different Latin American country such as Honduras or 
Nicaragua for example, those are economically challenged countries where the health care 
service is weak, the quality of the universities is low and there is a lack of medical expertise. A 
study of one such country would not enable us to separate and isolate the "effect of populism", 
as it would become challenging to see if their pandemic handling would be due to the populist 
running the country, or due to their lack of competence and state capacity. 
 
3.2.1 An extreme case of populism 
Gerring considers an extreme case method to be the method when one selects a case because 
of the extreme value on either the independent or the dependent variable. As my independent 
variable is populism, and my case for the independent variable is Bolsonaro, my case is thus 
what Gerring would consider an extreme case (2007b, 101). "Often an extreme case 
corresponds to a case that is considered to be prototypical or paradigmatic of some phenomena 
of interest. This is because concepts are often defined by their extremes, that is, their ideal 
types" (Gerring 2007b, 101). I have chosen an extreme case for populism (my independent 
variable) because if populism affects crisis management, then it is most likely that we will find 





in the previous section is that I consider Brazil to be a least-likely case (George and Bennett 
2005, 121). Brazil is least likely to display that populism has affected COVID-19 handling.  
My research question being a “how” question, I do not aim at discovering if populism exists 
but how it exists, making an extreme case the best and obvious choice for this study. Certain 
methodological value is provided with his case study containing an extreme case. The 
methodological value is derived from the extremity of the case, as Bolsonaro’s populism is 
characterised as an observation far away from the mean of the distribution (Gerring 2007b 101), 
(Mendonça and Duarte Caetano 2021, 210).  
Wanting a case that constitutes as much clarity as possible regarding the degree of populism, 
allows for me to look into how populism has affected crisis management, without ambiguity on 
whether or not, or to what extent the dependent variable is populist. I aim to discover what 
features of populism affects the independent variable; therefore, it became necessary to choose 
a case that was populist because if I had chosen a case who was not truly a populist, I would 
possibly not have made any finding of the mechanisms. Populism is an underlying prerequisite 
of the study. Bolsonaro showed all the important features one would look for when searching 
for a populist, and he is a case one could count on finding clear examples of how populism 
affects politics. 
 
3.2.2 Populist Jair Bolsonaro  
To proceed with this study, we need to establish whether Brazils President Jair Bolsonaro is to 
be characterised as a populist. Therefore, the following section will be dedicated to answering 
if Bolsonaro is a populist or not. When the far-right candidate Jairo Bolsonaro won the Brazilian 
presidential election on October 28th, 2018, he did so with 55% of the vote (Tribunal Superior 
Eleitoral, 2018). Given the political instability Brazil was facing as a consequence of the 2016 
political crisis, Bolsonaro`s win helped renew the democratic legitimacy (Smith 2020a, 79).  
There is consensus among scholars that Bolsonaro is a far-right populist (Neto and Pimenta 





The international media have far and wide written about Brazil`s president as "the populist", 
"the far-right populist", or the "right-wing populist" to mention some (Berg and Aragäo 2021; 
Brum 2021; Harris and Pooler 2021; Leonhardt and Leatherby 2020; Phillips 2020f). 
Despite different approaches to populism within the field of social sciences, Brazil`s current 
President Jair Bolsonaro is unanimously described as populist across scholars adopting various 
conceptualizations of the populism term. In the "Populism as Parody: The Visual Self-
Presentation of Jair Bolsonaro on Instagram" by Ricardo F. Mendonça and Renato Duarte 
Caetano (2021), Bolsonaro is described as populist making use of thin ideology also known as 
the ideational approach, in their study. The study by Eduardo Ryo Tamaki and Mario Fuks 
(2020) from 2020, also making use of the ideational approach to populism, finds Bolsonaro to 
be a populist via both a qualitative and a quantitative study. Similarly have the study by Serrano 
and Azucena (2019) on Brazil and Mexico`s presidents (2019) as they analyse Bolsonaro as a 
populist in accordance with the Ideational approach.  
Lasco and Curato (2019) introduced the concept of "medical populism" in relation to health 
emergencies. With this concept, Lasco and Curato were seeking to adjust their understanding 
of populism with Moffitt`s notion who identify populism as a "style", which Lasco (2020, 1418) 
explains as follows: (i.e., "the repertoires of performance that are used to create political 
relations"). In the 2020 study by Lasco and Curato stated that Bolsonaro: "…the president`s 
response to the pandemic shows clear features of medical populism, particularly in the way he 
has simplified it, and made a spectacle of his own antagonistic, denialist response". 
While Mudde (2007) on his hand views populism as "thin-centred ideology", Müller (2014) 
sees populism as a "political phenomenon", Laclau (2005) defines populism as a political logic 
and Moffitt (2016, 45) describes populism as "a political style that features an appeal to "the 
people" versus "the elite", bad manners and the performance of crisis breakdown or threat". 
Lasco and Curato (2019, 2) argue that this latter definition is broad enough not to be tied to 
definitions of populism that connect it to substantive worldviews (like how thin ideology 
demands adding for example nationalism). Furthermore, Lasco and Curato (2019, 2) argue that 
the definition is still specific enough (a frequent critique of thin-ideology) to characterise a 
political practice distinct from other responses. In The Politics of Authenticity and Populist 





Bolsonaro`s populist approach is questioned through the eyes of the Essex school brought to us 
by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
Also, scholars making use of the Essex school approach to populism frequently refer to or find 
that Bolsonaro is a populist. In his "New reflections on Ernesto Laclau`s theory of populism", 
Thomassen (2020, 734) characterises Bolsonaro as populist. In the book, Populismo (2019) 
Larraín provides a conceptual understanding of populism based on the Laclauian analysis – the 
Essex school. In his book, Larraín establishes Bolsonaro as a populist. The views and analysis 
of Larraín are addressed in the review by Rivera (2019). 
In her "Measuring Populism Worldwide" Pippa Norris (2020) addresses how systematic cross-
national evidence about populism have lagged behind, while she questions how populism can 
be measured in a consistent, valid, and reliable way. In the paper, Norris lists the populists: 
Donal Trump, Geert Wilders, Rodrigo Dutarte, Narendra Modi, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Marine 
Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Milos Zeman, Hugo Chavez, Bernie Sanders, Boris Johnson, Nigel 
Farage and finally: Jair Bolsonaro.  
As we have seen, populism is highly contested and debated as a concept, different schools of 
thought have different ways of viewing and determining populism. Nevertheless, they all seem 
to agree that Bolsonaro is a populist (Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi 2020; Bieber 2020; Clark and 
Patterson 2020; Duarte 2020; Edelman 2020; Hunter and Power 2019; Kavakli 2020; McQueen, 
Farache and Grigore 2020; Neto 2020; Semple 2020; Smith 2020a). Therefore, I consider 
Bolsonaro to be populist and the case could be considered to be an extreme case according to 
Gerring’s definition, who state that a case which holds an extreme value on either the 
independent or the dependent variable is to be characterised as an extreme case (2007b, 101).  
 
3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses to this case study 
In his What is a case study and what is it good for? from 2004, John Gerring lists strengths and 
weaknesses that should be considered when revising a case study as a research design. Gerring 
argues that if a field is dominated by case studies, another case study will be less needed. Just 
as in a field where cross-unit studies are prevailing, a case study given how it provides an in-
depth study focusing on single units is much needed (Gerring 2004, 353). In populism studies 





However, the relatively recent presidency of Bolsonaro, as well as the recent COVID-19 
pandemic have yet to be studied in several case studies. The case(s) are simply too new.  
Noticeable quantitative cross-unit work is Hawkins and Kaltwasser`s historical dataset of elite-
level populist discourse in Latin America, derived from textual analysis of Argentinian, Chilean 
and Peruvian presidential speeches from 1900 to 2000 (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017, 516). In 
addition to that dataset, there is also the Global Populism Database which measures the level 
of populist discourse in the speeches of 215 chief executives (presidents and prime ministers) 
from 66 countries across all continents mostly between 2000 and 2018 (Hawkins et al. 2019).  
Performing this case study has made me face several limitations and restrictions that 
undoubtfully become necessary to mention when listing weaknesses to this study. Most of all I 
have been working under several limitations. Writing the thesis, I have mostly been allocated 
at home as opposed to working from the university library or designated study areas. Also, I 
was not able to travel to Brazil – to São Paulo or Rio and to work from there. The COVID-19 
pandemic has affected the word community greatly in terms of travelling across borders and 
interacting with people, just to mention some consequences of the pandemic directly affecting 
my study. There have been periods where leaving my own house was advised against and 
writing a master's thesis alone in one's own private space have been solitary. Conversations and 
guidance from my supervisor have strictly been by phone or videocall, no physical presence 
allowed until the last weeks of working with the thesis. 
Furthermore, I have not been able to consider collecting my own data by travelling to Brazil, 
any kind of fieldwork has been out of the question. In other words, this case study is a case 
study performed under a set of restrictions and limitations that would not normally apply, 
neither before nor after the pandemic.  
Hawkins and Kaltwasser argue that Latin America has traditionally dominated populism studies, 
they, however, state that "Latin America still has something to offer to the comparative study 
of populism; the definitions developed in this region spring from an appreciation of actual 
movements and trends that are unusually strong" (2017, 514). My independent variable being 
populism put into a study with the case study as the research design is thus not ground-breaking 
on this field. But what is new, is the unique COVID-19 "twist" as I aim at looking into how 





to my study, deriving from a large focus on COVID-19. The international press, several scholars, 
and the public, in general, have all been occupied with one large subject during 2020 and the 
first half of 2021: COVID-19. I have benefitted from large amounts of solid sources on COVID-
19, both academic and media related. Of course, the recent nature of the pandemic has limited 
the amount of research on COVID-19, nevertheless, noticeable and relevant contributions have 
already emerged which have been useful to me during this study. My knowledge of Latin 
America and Brazil, as well as being a Spanish-speaker and in the process of learning 
Portuguese have given me advantages in understanding and interpreting the case, profiting from 
this study. 
Despite this being a case study, it will contain an aspect of implicit comparison. When looking 
into what Bolsonaro has said and done that seems reprehensible and stemmed from his populist 
approach, we to an extent note that it is different from how it could have been. Given how this 
case is an extreme case with aspects of least likely case, the ideal situation would be if 
Bolsonaro had shown a scientifically-based approach, thus I implicitly compare the outcome 
with that. 
 
3.4 Data selection  
 
When aiming at providing insight on both what has been the evidence and how the evidence 
can be understood, which will follow in the chapter on analysis, which data to look at becomes 
important. The following section is therefore dedicated to explaining what kind of data I have 
selected, and why. My research question is: How have populist governments responded to the 
COVID-19 pandemic crisis? And the sub-question: Which features characterise Bolsonaro's 
populism and how do these features become evident during a pandemic?  
 
I have chosen to document analyse data from Folha de São Paulo to answer my research 
question. A document analysis of a large daily newspaper will include daily updates and thus a 
large quantum of information on Bolsonaro during COVID-19. As I will do a qualitative 
document analysis, the Folha de São Paulo provides a functional search engine where 
everything published both online and in print is available, and I can easily access all data 





relationship between Bolsonaro and COVID-19, looking at his rhetoric and actions, and other 
relevant features that will shed light on how he has handled COVID-19.  
 
3.4.1 Document analysis  
 
The empirical information in this study is mainly collected from the Brazilian newspaper Folha 
de São Paulo. That makes this a document analysis. "In recent years there has been an increase 
in the number of research reports and journal articles that mention document analysis as part of 
the methodology" (Bowen 2009, 27). Bowen furthermore defines document analysis as a 
systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents be if both printed and electronic 
(2009, 27). These documents that may be included in a document analysis may appear in a large 
variety of shapes and forms. The different types of documents might include organisational or 
institutional reports, various public records, press releases, program proposals, application 
forms, summaries, radio and television program scripts and content from newspapers (Bowen 
2009 27-28).  
3.4.2 Freedom of press and Folha De São Paulo  
Reporters without borders yearly rates countries and how they performed on press freedom. In 
2020, Norway got rated as the number 1 on its World Press Freedom Index (Reporters without 
borders 2020). Brazil came in 107th place, just over Kuwait and Mali, and just below Angola 
and Montenegro (Reporters without borders 2020).  
"The coronavirus crisis exposed major problems in accessing information and gave rise to new 
attacks on the media by Bolsonaro, who blamed and scapegoated them for the crisis." 
(Reporters without borders 2021). In Brazil, journalism has been especially problematic since 
Bolsonaro became elected president in October 2018. Bolsonaro adopted a trademark of 
humiliating, insulting, denigrating, and stigmatising journalists (Reporters without borders 
2021). There have been several threats and physical attacks making Brazil an especially violent 
country for the media where many journalists have been killed in connection with their work 
(Reporters without borders 2021). Folha is the biggest newspaper in Brazil. Folha has 285,000 





"Folha sets out the premise of its editorial line in order to search for critical journalism being 
nonpartisan and pluralist. These characteristics, which guide the work of the employees of the 
Folha groups, is detailed from year 1981 and onwards in different editorial projects" (Folha De 
São Paulo 2021, my translation).  
By making use of the Folha search engine the search words "Bolsonaro coronavirus" filtered 
on everything published in Folha between 01.01.2020 till 31.12.2020 reveals 6325 hits. These 
hits include everything published in Folha in Portuguese: "Tudo Na Folha".11 There has been 
made several searches on the same two words filtering the same timeframe at different times, 
to make sure that the identical number of hits is in fact constant. The search word "coronavirus" 
is made use of instead of for example "COVID-19", as "coronavirus" has more hits than 
"COVID-19" (the search "Bolsonaro COVID-19" in the same time frame presents 4120 hits). 
In the Folha search engine – "coronavirus" is more used and the editorial norm.  
Similarly, I have chosen to search for "Bolsonaro" and not "Bolsonaro governo" ("governo" 
meaning government in Portuguese) or any other form including "governo". This is due to two 
reasons. First, I worked inductively by reading Folha publications gathering knowledge on the 
editorial norm in terms of which phrases were used for what. I then found that Bolsonaro was 
much more often mentioned than references to his government, in several publications, he 
would be mentioned concerning COVID-19, without necessarily mention of his government. 
Second, populism is strongly linked to a strong leader (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2014). "Most 
authors noted a personalistic, plebiscitarian style of political leadership as a defining 
characteristic of populism. A charismatic individual wins and exercises power by maintaining 
direct, unmediated contact with a largely unorganized mass of followers (Weyland 2001, 5). 
The choice of linking the populism existing in Brazil to their president rather than to their 
government was therefore made.  
Furthermore, to get an overview of what the coverage of COVID-19 and Bolsonaro has 
looked like in Folha De São Paulo, I analysed all the 6325 publications by monthly searches 
 
11 The categories Folha de São Paulo operates with in their search engine filter options, that they have 
chategorized their content in include the following: “Editorias”, “Edição Impressa”, “Blogs”, “Agora”, 
“DataFolha”, “Livraria Da Folha” and “Especiais”. In English: “Editorials”, “Printed Edition”, “Blogs”, “Now”, 





from the 1.st till the last day of each month, first noting how many publications in total (and 
monthly) contained the search words "Bolsonaro coronavirus". I then browsed through all the 
total articles for each month, month by month noting what were the main topics that 
frequented the publications, which I structured into certain categories. See table 4.4 in the  
chapter on analysis. 
 
3.5 Measuring the four mechanisms of populism by content 
analysis 
As I now have accounts for the use of Folha De São Paulo and how I have filtered and selected 
relevant articles – in total 6325 publications for all of 2020, these publications make way for 
my further analysis. This section is dedicated to the methodological approach to the four 
mechanisms of populism. There will firstly be a short introduction explaining the general 
approach, before a more in-depth account will be given of how I have analysed each mechanism 
separately. How articles have been coded and selected, and the choice to analyse the data 
qualitatively will be commented on. The 6325 publications from Folha de São Paulo all contain 
"Bolsonaro" and "coronavirus". The publications will be browsed and categorized into topics, 
looking into which topics are present at what month and for how long. The data will give insight 
into what Bolsonaro's approach to COVID-19 has been during 2020.  
Content analysis is used as a method for analysing the data material. The content analysis has 
qualitative features to it. The qualitative content analysis uses documents as a source and 
systematization of content elements or selected text quotations to clarify which values appear 
in different texts (Grønmo 2004, 128). Values such as proximity and sensitivity are emphasized 
to a greater extent in qualitative content analysis by assessing to a lesser extent in advance 
already determined relevant data (Grønmo 2004, 130). This is especially useful, given how a 
qualitative content analysis provides opportunities for interpretation of which data is relevant 
and makes it possible to choose the information that is best suited concerning the specificity of 
the source and to shed light on the problem (Grønmo 2004, 131).  
Given the explained choices of search words being "Bolsonaro coronavirus", this left me with 
a selection of 6325 publications. I have structured the findings into tables providing an overview 





subjects were more frequently addressed, month by month in addition to a timeline. My 
approach with the analysis was to read all publications in January when I addressed January, 
February when I addressed February, and so on. I discovered which subjects dominating the 
coverage, and which subjects were less evident. During this analysis of the 6325 publications 
month by month, my approach was to note which publications I would save for the next analysis 
that would be dedicated to taking a closer look at each of the four mechanisms of populism. 
Some key publications were selected as they individually represented a topic that was a monthly 
tendency. As made account for in the previous chapter on a theoretical framework, McKee et 
al. argue that blaming outsiders and victims, contempt for institutions, denialism and suspicion 
of elites can appear as a link between populism and COVID-19. In the next chapter dedicated 
to the empirical analysis; these mechanisms will be used as a tool when looking into how they 
have affected policy in times of COVID-19 as well as how governments have responded to the 
crisis of COVID-19. 
Mechanism (1): "Blaming Outsiders and Victims" is defined as a constructed "insider-outsider" 
narrative, where a populist leader claims to "save" his/her people, also establishing 
himself/herself as free of guilt (McKee et al. 2020, 2). Using the 6325 publications as a 
foundation, I by browsing these publications for the monthly tendency analysis, had selected, 
and saved publications containing blaming outsiders and victims. I looked for Bolsonaro 
expressing rhetoric where he placed wrongful blame for COVID-19. What I looked for when 
selecting and saving publications containing blaming outsiders and victims was Bolsonaro 
placing blame. As COVID-19 is a virus, the groups that Bolsonaro turned out to blamed for the 
spread and deaths of COVID-19 did not have any scientific proof against them. In other words, 
I considered the blame Bolsonaro placed to be wrongful, thus defining these groups as 
"outsiders" or "victims". Browsing the 6325 publications was somewhat time-consuming but 
rewarding in terms of paving way for a qualitative categorization and thus necessary insight on 
the data. Some of the understanding of what constituted Bolsonaro's COVID-19 handling 
concerning blaming outsiders and victims was obtained as deductive knowledge while 
analysing the publications for monthly tendencies analysis of the overall Folha coverage.  
Mechanism (2): "Contempt for Institutions" is defined by McKee et al. (2020, 2) as a 
mechanism containing features to populism. First is the contempt for elites and traditional 





populists discredit, neglect, deny necessary funding and leave key positions unfilled within the 
public health institution. When coding the 6325 publications as containing contempt for 
institutions, I looked for several things. I considered contempt for institutions to include 
Bolsonaro's possible rhetoric, statements, and policy actions in relation to or towards other 
institutions such as the Ministry of Health or The Supreme Federal Court. The chapter on 
analysis, therefore, contains a dedicated table displaying which policy responses have been 
present on a national level, involving Bolsonaro and his government. 
Now the analysis of the Folha publications had a deductive approach, browsing the 6325 
publications searching for Bolsonaro acting or saying things showing him having contempt for 
institutions. As the ministry of health played an inevitably central role in the COVID-19 
pandemic, this was reflected in the Folha coverage, and I found large amounts of data that I 
could cite and use when I considered contempt for institutions. I namely looked for the 
interaction between Bolsonaro and the institutions (to a large extent the Ministry of Health and 
the Supreme Federal Court). I looked at publications where Bolsonaro made comments on one 
or more institutions. I also looked at publications containing Bolsonaro shifting course or 
changing his opinion on policies, resulting in an ad hoc-ness which McKee et al. (2020, 2) 
include in a feature to contempt for institutions. Although some observations in the data could 
have been views as more than one mechanism, I, for the sake of structure and simplicity, treated 
all observations including the institutions (such as the Supreme Federal Court and The ministry 
of health) under the section analysing contempt for institutions. 
Mechanism (3): "Denialism" is central to understanding how populists act facing COVID-19, 
McKee et al. (2020, 2) argue. When systematically coding Folha publications in search for 
denialism, I considered how the mechanism includes populists promoting conspiracy theories, 
cherry-picking evidence, citing false experts, moving goalposts, and employing a range of 
logical fallacies. These listed features were coded for while browsing the 6325 publications. I 
looked at Bolsonaro's rhetoric and actions, deductively discovering Bolsonaro's frequent 
encouraging to demonstrate and thus cause agglomerations and crowing. Bolsonaro's actions 
and the way he thus perceived himself abstaining from applicable COVID-19 regulations such 
as wearing a mask and keeping social distance, was also coded as denialism. During my coding, 
I saw how the data contained descriptions of actions implicitly denialism (actions), not just 





to what the different institutions (such as state governments – for example Doria, the governor 
of São Paulo) had determined. If there was a lockdown in São Paulo and Bolsonaro pushed for 
the return to work and school, that fell under my categorization of denialism. 
Mechanism (4): "Suspicion of Elites" put the media at the core of the phenomenon. When 
coding for this mechanism, I looked for how Bolsonaro would describe the media that 
criticised his political message, painting the media as a "corrupt elite". Furthermore, suspicion 
of elites also includes a populist's suspicion towards a financial elite or a cultural elite who are 
being placed in a narrative by the populist, where this elite is working against the general 
will/the best for the people. A somewhat us-them, above-down rhetoric. More than anything, 
coding for suspicion of elites focused on the media and how Bolsonaro talked about it, 
handled it, and treated the media. I also coded how Bolsonaro encouraged his supporters to 
harass and discredit the press as suspicion of elites. Furthermore, the 6325 publications 
contained elements of Bolsonaro painting a picture of "the people" set out against different 
groups, saying they had conflicting interests as suspicion of elites. 
 
 
3.6  Reliability and Validity 
 
The precision of the data is defined by its reliability, which is determined by who precise the 
measure in the study is. As Kellstedt and Whitten (2018, 114) argue: Valid research measures 
exactly what it has as a purpose to measure. My main data source is the Brazilian newspaper 
Folha De São Paulo (hereafter "Folha"), the largest and most serious newspaper in Brazil. 
Politically, Folha is understood as centrical and as an objective source of information. 
I consider what to be reported in Folha to be truthful as it is fact-oriented. I consider my study 
to have validity as it measures what it has as purpose to measure; I am analysing Bolsonaro's 
actions and Folha is a reliable national newspaper. The content found in Folha is wide enough 
for my analysing and limiting the content for which I will analyse. A considered option was to 
analyze official political decrees and statements issued by the Federal Government, the 
President and the different ministries. However, this was dismissed due to assuming it would 
be time-consuming, unnecessary and unpragmatic. Considering that Folha contains the most 
important information from these official statements and decrees, I have chosen Folha for the 





“Bolsonaro coronavirus) which are open and include a large sample of information relevant to 
my study, excluding as little relevant data as thought possible. 
I could have included several different newspaper sources, but as I am interested in fact-oriented 
data Folha should be sufficient. In the case that my research called for an analysis of more 
subjective data, it would have been more reasonable to include several different newspapers 
providing a wider range of perspectives. However, this is not the case for this study. Folha as 
my main source is sufficient as it is considered valid for this study. 
Furthermore, this study is reliable for 2020 which it aims to be, as my analysis covers the 
whole period. The study is not looking at a selected period of the year, but the year as a 
whole. In that way, I achieve a holistic perspective and can answer the research question 
validly and reliably. My research question is quite open and reaching wide. The structure of 
the study and selected data provides valid information to answer the question. There will 
always be hidden information Folha does not report on, but I analyze what can be observed 

















4.0 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND ANALYTICAL 
DISCUSSION 
Based on the previous review of literature, theory and methods, this following chapter will aim 
to provide an answer to the research question: “How have populist governments responded to 
the COVID-19 pandemic crisis? and sub-question: Which features characterise Bolsonaro's 
populism and how do these features become evident during a pandemic?  
 
4.1 Understanding Brazil during COVID-19 
 
My independent variable is populism, and I have established that the Brazilian president is 
indeed a populist, we are now at the stage of looking into what this has meant for the handling 
and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter is therefore dedicated to analysing and 
describing the dependent variable and how populism through the four mechanisms of populism, 
looking into how these mechanisms have influenced the dependent variable.  
The chapter is structured firstly in a short presentation of the COVID-19 situation in Brazil, the 
unfolding of the pandemic and the response to it. This presentation will solemnly be based on 
empirical evidence. Secondly, I will perform a step-by-step analytical review of the earlier 
presented four mechanisms of populism, reviewing the mechanisms in light of empirical 
evidence from the Brazilian case. The methodological approach has been accounted for in the 
previous chapter dedicated to this purpose, along with existing weaknesses and limitations to 
this study. There will be a discussion of the findings throughout the chapter as the analytical 
discussion is contingent. A summary of the chapter with main takeaways and a discussion of 
the findings is presented at the end.  
 
4.2 The Brazilian COVID-19 response 
 
In Brazil, the first case of COVID-19 was detected on 25 February 2020. By 31 May 2020, 
Brazil had experienced 29 thousand deaths from COVID-19 and the R-value was estimated at 





seriously affected countries" (Buss et al. 2020, 856).12 On 3rd of February 2020 Brazil declared 
COVID-19 a national public health emergency. As the largest city in South America, São Paulo 
receives a greater proportion of international flights than any other Brazilian city, and the first 
Brazilian case of COVID-19 came indeed from a traveller returning to São Paulo from Italy 
(Buss et al. 2020, 856).  
4.2.1 The course of COVID-19 in Brazil  
With its over 211 million people Brazil faced COVID-19 in the early days of 2020 (The World 
Bank 2021).13 When the WHO declared the disease a global pandemic on March 11th, 2020, 
they also recommended the implementation of nonpharmaceutical interventions aiming to slow 
the spread of infection and thus reduce the intensity of the epidemic. These measures were 
presented to prevent the health systems from becoming overwhelmed (Leone 2021, 11). 
Various nonpharmaceutical interventions were considered, however mathematical modelling 
of how the transition played out did indicate that social distancing practised by the population 
as a whole is the most effective way to combat the spread of the coronavirus (Leone 2021, 11). 
As of 7th of April 2021, 10:44 am CEST Brazil has 13 million confirmed cases of COVID-19, 
starting the count on 3rd of January 2020. At the same time, the number of confirmed deaths is 
332 thousand (World Health Organization 2020e). On May 13th, 2021, Brazil reached 200.2 
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The following figure 4.1. Displays how many new cases of 
COVID-19 a set of Latin American countries had month by month in 2020, per 100,000 
inhabitants. As the figure below shows, Brazil is an outlier in terms of total cases of infected 
per month from August till November. Figure 4.1 displays a selection of Latin American 
countries to provide a context and comparison to Brazil. Originally, the countries Mexico, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Uruguay were included too but their similar values made the visibility 
difficult in the figure. Therefore, a full overview that includes these countries can be found in 
Appendix as attachment 2. In Figure 4.1, the mentioned countries are shown with average value.
 
12 The R number is a way of rating coronavirus or any disease´ ability to spread, R stands for the reproduction 
number (Gov.uk 2020). If the R value is 1 it means that on average, every person who is infected will infect 1 
other person, the total number of infections is thus stable. Importantly: if R is greater than 1 the epidemic is 
growing, if R is less than 1 the epidemic is shrinking (Gov.uk 2020).  





Figure 4.1.: New cases of infected by COVID-19 per month (not acumulated) per 100,000 person.14 
 
Data in figure collected from the WHO dataset: “Daily cases and deaths by date reported to WHO” (World Health Organization 2020f).
 
14 A complete graph including Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador which in Figure 4.1. Appear as an average, can be found  attached in Appendix as 
attachment 2. Appendix attachment 1 displays the values in numeric table. These four countries have been excluded from Figure 4.1 in order to make the Figure more 





For the sake of adjusting the population to display values per 100,000-person, population data 
collected from The World Bank has been used.15 
Figure 4.1 visualises how Brazil has fewer cases of infection except for July when Brazil has 
the most cases out of all the included countries. Interpreting these numbers, the spread of 
COVID-19 has not happened to a far larger extent in Brazil than in any other Latin American 
country. There is a visual peak in the spread in the early months of the pandemic, from April 
till July. As the spread seems to descend in July and "stabilize" on a level more similar to its 
fellow regional neighbours, the evidence of spread from the early days of the pandemic is clear. 
We also see how the spread again raises from November and onwards. Table 4.1 shows how 
further development lead Brazil to have the highest level of infection and the second-highest 
level of deaths per 7th of April 2021, per 100,000 persons.  
Table 4.1: The accumulated amount of deaths and infections per 100,000, per country 7th April 
2020. Data collected from the Our World in Data dataset (Our World in data 2021).
 
15 See attachment 5 in appendix for table displaying population per country.  
Country              Infected               Deaths 
Brazil 6,040 160 
Chile 5,248 124 
Argentina       5,228        106 
Colombia 4,751 127 
Peru 4,736 450 
Uruguay 3,114 35 
Paraguay 3,032 64 
Bolivia 2,341 106 
Ecuador 1,872 96 
Mexico 1,740 159 





In light of the evidence from the numbers of dead and infected in Brazil and other Latin 
American countries throughout 2020, the situation for Brazil has not been favourable. The 
numbers have been high, much higher than what could be expected from a country in Brazil's 
position regarding institutional performance and capacity.  
As seen in table 4.1, Brazil experienced higher numbers of infected then what would be an 
expectedly, given the comparison to the lower level of death and infected its neighbour 
countries show. These other Latin American countries included have undoubtfully weaker 
health and bureaucratic prerequisites than Brazil. The only country with more deaths per 
100,000 than Brazil is Peru. Brazil has the most infected people by COVID-19. This is 
surprising in many ways. As made account for in section 3.3 "Selecting the case" in my chapter 
on methodology, Brazil is in many ways not like its Latin American neighbours and can thus 
not be expected to perform similarly. As stated in section 3.2: Brazil is the most populated 
country in Latin South America (Pasquali 2020). Love (2018, 863) argues that in comparison 
to the other Latin American countries, Brazil`s "government has the highest per capita and 
absolute spending on research and development".  
Furthermore, Melo and Pereira (2013, 11) stated that Brazil`s bureaucracy ranked first of twenty 
of the regions' nations according to the Inter-American Development Bank. In the years before 
2016, Brazil's expenditure matched OECD levels, with the highest social spending per capital, 
along with the highest government expenditure as a share of GDP (Alston et al. 2016, 130). 
Given our expectations to Brazil, we expected fewer dead and infected than how it turned out 
to be. One could view this as an enormous underperformance. 
As we now have regarded the numbers of infected, I also wish to present overviews of the 
number of COVID-19 deaths. Figure 4.2. Show the number of COVID-19 deaths adjusted to 
the population by 100,000. The Brazilian numbers of COVID-19 deaths appear similar to those 






Figure 4.2.: New COVID-19 deaths by country and month, per 100,000. Not accumulated.16 
 
Data in figure collected from the WHO dataset: “Daily cases and deaths by date reported to WHO” (World Health Organization 2020f).
 
16 The value “Average (excluded countries) is an average for the values of the countries Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay as they had similar values. A figure including these 





The question then becomes: "Why, has populism got something to do with this?". Why has 
Brazil despite its institutional and financial capacity, ranking higher than its neighbouring 
countries on the continent on measures such as spending on research and development, 
bureaucracy with the highest quality and social spending per capita yet still NOT showing lower 
numbers of infected or dead by COVID-19? Brazil's expenditure on health, research, and social 
spending match OECD levels. Nevertheless, Brazils COVID-19 deaths and infections show 
numbers similar/worse than its Latin American neighbours. This is in many ways surprising. 
The expectation was that Brazil would show signs of a more contained infection of COVID-19. 
One could expect Brazil to be a country given its levels of expertise and development, that 
should be able to respond well to the COVID-19 pandemic, but it has not.   
 
4.2.2. COVID-19 measures issued by the Brazilian Federal Government 
Having accounted for the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil through numbers of infected and 
deaths, the notion that Brazil has not performed "well" is further supported. The question one 
might ask oneself, is "why?". The following section will therefore be dedicated to an account 
of which measures the Brazilian Federal Government has set in motion in dealing with COVID-
19. I present a timeline before discussing some tendencies and noticeable features.  
 
Table 4.2: Timeline of Brazilian Federal Government response to COVID-19. Source for the 
table: Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 29-116.  
 
February Measure  
03/02 The Ministry of Health declares Emergency of national importance in public health and establish 
a Health Emergency Operations Centre as a coordinated response management. 
06/02 The president sanctions law 13,979 – the coronavirus law providing measures for coping with the 
pandemic.17  
13.02 Ministry of Health present National contingency plan for  COVID-19 infection.18 
March  
 
17 The measures are: “isolation, quarantine; determination of compulsory medical examinations, laboratory tests, 
collection of clinical samples, vaccination and other prophylactic measures or treatments specific 
doctors; epidemiological study or investigation; exhumation, necropsy, cremation, and handling of 
corpses; exceptional and temporary restriction entry and exit from the country” (Universidade de São Paulo 
2021, 29 my translation). 
18 The plan included: “surveillance, laboratory support, infection control measures, care pharmaceutical, health 
surveillance, health measures at entry points (ports, airports, and border crossings), risk communication and 





11/03 Ministry of Health regulates law 13,979 changing quarantine measures.19 
16/03 The Minister of Health presents national contingency plan for the infection of COVID-19 in 
indigenous communities, without any concrete measures or defined responsibilities. The Supreme 
Federal Court presented an injunction determining the adoption of coping measures for indigenous 
communities facing COVID-19. The measures were repeatedly breached, resulting in the Supreme 
Federal Court adopting succession of measures later on in 2020. 
17/03 The ministry of Health and the ministry of Justice established which criminal sanctions non-
compliance with law 13,979 would result in. (This was later revoked in May when both ministers 
were replaced). 
17/03 Venezuelans (as the only nationality) is restricted entry to Brazil by road or land. 
20/03 Bolsonaro amends law 13,979 to give himself the right to dispose of public services and essential 
activities through a decree, attempting to redistribute health policy power in his favour. (on 24th of 
March the Supreme Federal Court grants an injunction assigning states and municipalities the 
competence to dispose, by decree on public services and essential activities).  
23/03 The Federal government sought to take over some pulmonary ventilators purchased by the city of 
Recife. The Federal Government argued that they had the right to due so according to law 13,979. 
This became a huge legal dispute on federal autonomy, ending in a court ordering the Federal 
Government to refrain from requesting the ventilators. 
24/03 The Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (Anvisa) released government distribution of 
chloroquine-based medicines without needing special prescription. 
25/03 The Federal Government introduced decree 10,292 defining all religious activities as essential 
during the pandemic. 
26/03 The Federal Government launches the “Brazil cannot stop” campaign encouraging people to go 
back to work. The Supreme Federal Court banned the campaign. 
April  
02/04 The Federal Government introduces financial emergency aid for unemployed workers in the 
informal sector, due to COVID-19.  
08/04 The Supreme Federal Court grants injunction ensuring states and municipalities to exercise legal 
restrictions during the pandemic.  
16/04 Bolsonaro dismisses Minister of Health Luiz Henrique Mandetta because of Mandetta refusing to 
promote the use of chloroquine.  
22/04 The Supreme Federal court disclosed on 22/05 the content from a ministerial meeting that took 
place the 22/04. At the meeting Bolsonaro told ministers to avoid spreading fear in the public, 
downplaying the seriousness of the pandemic.  
22/04 The foreign minister published an article on his blog titled “The coronavirus has arrived”, attacks 
the WHO comparing their recommendations to communism.  
28/04 The Federal Government modifies a decree by adding several activities in the; chemical, 
petrochemical, and plastic sector to the list of essential activities that cannot be interrupted by the 
pandemic. 
May  
04/05 The Supreme Federal Court established, in response to a request from the state Mato Grosso, that 
respirators purchased by states are public assets and cannot be subject to administrative request, 
except for in the duration of state of defence or siege. 
 
19 The changes on quarantine regulations determined that  the quarantine: "will be determined by administrative 
act formal and duly motivated and must be edited by the Secretary of Health of the State, Municipality, Federal 
District or Minister of State for Health or higher at each management level, published in the DOU and widely 





07/05 Bolsonaro amended decree 10,342 to include civil construction as an essential activity during the 
pandemic. 
07/05 Bolsonaro, some ministers and businessmen surprise visited the (at the time) President of the 
Supreme Court, Dias Toffoli. The visit was described as a way of pressuring Toffoli into complying 
with Bolsonaro anti-quarantine measures 
11/05 Bolsonaro amends decree 10,344 to include beauty salons and barber shops, sports academies 
among key activities during the pandemic.  
13/05 Bolsonaro issued a provisional measure (MP 966) saying public agents only could be punished in 
the civil and administrative sphere for acts committed in confronting the coronavirus pandemic. 
The Supreme Federal Court limited the provisional measure and decided that public agents can be 
punished for acts that go against science.  
14/05 Bolsonaro vetoes a law and constructs it from expanding the reach of financial emergency aid.20  
20/05 Ministry of Health published information guidelines promoting the use of chloroquine as treatment 
for patients with mild COVID-19 symptoms.  
27/05  The minister of Justice (André Luiz de Almeida Mendonça) and the Minister of Health (Eduardo 
Pazuello) revokes the ordinance maid by their predecessors on 17th of March. The ordinance 
revoked provided mandatory measures for COVID-19 such as isolation and quarantine.  
June   
03/06 The Ministry of Health releases COVID-19 data late that day: after 10pm. The ministry says the 
delay was not intentional. 
05/06 The ministry of Health’s website on COVID-19 data is down before returning the next day, then 
only showing data from the last 24 hours. The Supreme Federal court (on the same day) granted 
injunction and determined that the data should be fully restored, by the Ministry of Health, as it 
appeared before it disappeared on the 04/06. 
24/06 The Federal court of accounts alerted the Civil house of the Presidency of the Republic about the 
lack of a strategic guideline and a coordinated communication plan for confronting COVID-19.21 
 July   
02/07 Bolsonaro vetoed previsions of law 14,019 which would establish the mandatory use of masks.22 
Bolsonaro also vetoed granting federal entities the possibility to issue fines when failure to comply 
with the obligation to use masks. The national Congress overturned the veto, keeping the 
provisions.  
06/07 Bolsonaro again vetoes the mask law, despite the expiration of the period of fifteen days for 
exercising the veto right. On 30/08 The Supreme Federal Court reinstates the validity of the vetoed 
provision, stating that Bolsonaro vetoing the law is unconstitutional.  
07/07 Bolsonaro vetoes several provisions of law 14,021 which determines protective measures such as 
urgent access to drinking water, hygiene and cleaning material, hospital beds, ventilators, and 
oxygen etc.) for indigenous communities. 
11/07 The Supreme Federal Court defines the Federal Government’s response to the pandemic as 
genocide. 
30/07 The Minister of Health expands the guidance of prescription of chloroquine and 
hydroxychloroquine for pregnant patients against COVID-19 
 
20 The law 14,998 would include artisanal fishermen, taxi drivers, app drivers, school transport drivers, 
application, self-employed physical education professionals, street vendors, marketers, waiters, nannies, 
manicures, hairdressers and hired teachers who are without a salary (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 53). 
21 Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU). 
22 The law was defined to be used in commercial and industrial establishments, religious temples, schools, and 






03/08 Bolsonaro vetoes the entire bill 1,826 which provided financial compensation to health workers 
incapacitated by COVID-19. The veto was rejected by the national Congress in March 2021.  
15/08 The Federal Government ignores a proposal from Pfizer offering Brazil to buy the vaccines 
delivered in December 2020. 
23/08 Special advisor to the Bolsonaro, Arthur Weinstraub states that masks don’t protect and that the 
measures will ruin the economy.  
24/08 The Federal Government publishes a post saying how the crisis should not be used as a political 
instrument, that it could have been possible to save more lives. 
24/08 The Federal Government organizes the event “Brazil winning over COVID-19” and the President 
states: “If it [chloroquine] had not been politicized, a lot of more lives could have been saved….” 
(Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 84, my translation).  




19/10 The Ministry of Science and Technology announced that nitazoxanide (used against worms) 
managed to reduce viral load for COVID-19.23, 24 The ministry said they could not present evidence 
because an article of the study had been forwarded to an international scientific journal which 
required originality.  
20/10 Bolsonaro refused the Minister of Health to purchase of 46 million doses of Coronavac, saying that 
the Brazilian people would not be guinea pigs.  
November  
22/11 The Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo reported that the ministry of health had 6,86 million 
unused COVID-19 tests that would expire between December 2020 and January 20201.  
December  
01/12 Ministry of Education determined that higher education that is part of the federal system be 
returned to physical presence 1st of April 2021. It was later amended to 1st of March 2021. 
08/12 The Federal Court of Accounts concluded that founds meant for the public information campaigns 
on COVID-19 had been used wrongfully. 
08/12 Eleven former ministers of health from different parties published an article denouncing “the 
disastrous and inefficient conduct of the Ministry of Health in regarding the Brazilian population 
vaccination strategy against COVID-19” (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 107, my translation). 
14/12 According to the Ministry of Health there were a 32% drop in hospital beds dedicated to COVID-
19 patients, in December compared to in July. 3297 units had been closed.  
16/12 The Ministry of Health presented the “National Plan for operationalization of vaccination”.  
17/12 Bolsonaro edited a provisional measure to comply with a determination from the Supreme Federal 
Court. The provision secured extraordinary credit for the Ministry of Health to buy vaccines and 
thus implement their vaccine plan; The national plan for operationalization of vaccination. 
18/12 The Supreme Federal Court did not approve the third version of the “general plan to combat 
COVID-19 for indigenous peoples”, by the government. The Supreme Federal Court justified the 
decision saying that the government’s plan put the lives and health of the indigenous people at risk, 
and that the plan for generic.  
 
23 Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovaçoes (MCTI).  
24 The higher viral load the more sever active viral infection. In relation to COVID-19 higher viral load means 





18/12 The Supreme Federal Court extended (indefinitely) the authorization to state and municipal 
authorities to adopt measures such as isolation and quarantine, import medical supplies.  
30/12 The Health Ministry had given thousands of masks and protective equipment considered 
inappropriate for use by health personnel, to federal districts.  
31/12 According to the National Health Council, around 33 billion reais that could have been earmarked 
for measures that could have contributed effectively to social distancing and job maintenance of 
the population’s income, were not used until the end of the year 2020.25 
 
I will now show how Brazil has performed during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of policy 
responses and approaches, steaming from the Federal Government. By presenting this timeline 
I wish to draw attention to all evidence pointing to how the Federal Government, ministers and 
Bolsonaro have delayed and hindered COVID-19 measures from being implemented, already 
from February when Bolsonaro vetoed a coronavirus law that could provide containment 
measures. As governments around the world have chosen different attitudes and approaches, 
global health institutions such as the WHO have constantly presented guidelines and 
recommendations governments have chosen to follow to a varying degree. The Brazilian 
Federal Government have not been unified in its pandemic response. The Ministry of Health 
has been unpredictable in its opinion on the chloroquine-based treatment of COVID-19. As 
early as March, The Heath Regulatory Agency (Anvisa) provided distribution of chloroquine-
based medicines without needing a special prescription. Furthermore, the Federal 
Government/President Bolsonaro has on several occasions vetoed or amended laws related to 
COVID-19 originating from other institutions. The President and his government have also, on 
multiple occasions sought to actively work against the COVID-19 restrictive measures issued 
in states by governors. Bolsonaro did this by trying to "ease up" what constituted essential 
activities.  
An overall characteristic that has marked their response during 2020 is how the Federal 
Government can seem to have prioritized the economy over containment measures, by 
frequently creating measures to stimulate and keep the economy going. On one occasion in 
August Bolsonaro's special adviser stated that masks didn't work and that they would ruin the 
economy. Another interesting factor is how the Supreme Federal Court and the Federal 
Government does not seem to agree. The Supreme Federal Court defined the Federal 
 






Government's response to the pandemic as genocide in July. Later on, in September, the 
Supreme Federal Court refused to approve the protective plan for indigenous communities 
issued by the Federal Government, based on it being too vague and without defined tasks and 
responsibilities.  
Furthermore, table 4.2 shows how the Federal Government ignored an offer from Pfizer to buy 
COVID-19 vaccines.26 In addition to that, the Federal Government rejected an offer of donation 
COVID-19 test kits from LG International and how they had large amounts of unused COVID-
19 tests that would shortly expire. Also, it became evident that the Federal Government had 
handed out unfit protection equipment to federal districts. Table 4.2 shows how the Federal 
Government and Bolsonaro have constantly worked against the Supreme Federal Court, vetoed, 
and amended laws to become smaller and less impactful meant, which were originally meant 
as tools in the fight against COVID-19. In addition to that, the table 4.2 displays how the Federal 
Government have neglected their task of efficiently maintaining the Brazilian public's interest: 
keeping people healthy and alive. 
 
4.3 Populism during COVID-19 in Brazil   
 
As the previous section provided an overview of the evidence in terms of takeaways from 
Brazil's experience with COVID-19, we now have a better picture of how the pandemic has 
affected Brazil. To provide some possible clarity as to how Brazil has performed and responded 
to the pandemic as it has, we proceed with our analysis. Keeping in mind the research question 
“How have populist governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis?” and sub-
question: Which features characterise Bolsonaro's populism and how do these features become 
evident during a pandemic?  
I now focus on the four mechanisms of populism presented and accounted for in the chapter on 
a theoretical framework. Thus, the following section will analyse Bolsonaro, and the extended 
form, shape and size of his COVID-19 response being characterised by blaming outsiders and 
victims, contempt for institutions, denialism, and suspicion of elites. Bolsonaro. Firstly, I 
present an analysis of a year of COVID-19 and Bolsonaro coverage in Folha De São Paulo 
 
26 The Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine is developed by the German company BioNTech in collaboration 





focusing on accounting for what has been the main tendencies over time in the coverage. 
Secondly, that will be followed by a step-by-step review of the four mechanisms, one at a time, 
aiming at identifying expected observable implications qualitatively in a then already selected 
number of articles from Folha that had been sought out during the analysis of the tendencies 
monthly, throughout the year.  
 
4.3.1 A year of COVID-19 in Folha De São Paulo  
As made account for in the previous chapter on methodology, the Brazilian newspaper Folha 
De São Paulo (hereafter Folha) is my main data source. To get an overview and impression of 
what the COVID-19 linked to Bolsonaro coverage has looked like, I performed an analysis of 
all articles with a wide and including search words. 
 
Table 4.3.: Folha de São Paulo publications “Bolsonaro coronavirus”.   
 
           Month Number of publications 
      January 2020 32 
February 2020 125 
March 2020 1242 
April 2020 1226 
May 2020 932 
June 2020 625 
July 2020 514 
August 2020 359 
September 2020 310 
October 2020 361 
November 2020 285 
December 2020 309 
 
The Folha search engine reveals a total of 6325 hits in their database when searching for 
"Bolsonaro coronavirus" on everything published from 01.01.2020 till 31.12.2020 (see in debt 
explanation of search in Chapter on methodology). Table 4.3 reveals that there is a clear 
overweight of articles written containing "Bolsonaro coronavirus" in the early months of the 






The following months display a continuous large number of publications throughout April and 
May, as it steadily decreases in numbers and flattens around 300-350 publications a month 
through August till December 2020. This is more or less the same tendency in several 
publications in Folha as it is in numbers of dead and infected by COVID-19 in Brazil, as 
presented in figures 4.1 and 4.2. By systematically working the way through all 6325 headlines, 
a certain impression is made. An overview of the content is presented in table 4.4. 
 




   
 
 Main tendencies in Folha 










• The coverage is mainly focused on China and Brazilians in Wuhan.  
• the virus spreading within China.  
February 
2020 
• The subject of the Brazilians in China, their return and quarantine rules. 






• How the virus is affecting the world economy and currencies, weak USD, and Brazilian 
investment sinking. 
• Fall in oil prices and in the Brazilian stock market. 
• Bolsonaro and Governors/Congress arguing on coronavirus handling.  
• Bolsonaro underestimating the virus. 
• Bolsonaro meeting Pro-Government protesters without a mask, while shaking hands with 





• The discussion on emergency aid for people affected by COVID-19.  
• Chloroquine as medicine, and the distribution and debate about effects.  
• Henrique Mandetta (the minister of health) and his approach to the virus. 
• Mandetta gets fired due to disagreeing with Bolsonaro on virus handling. 
• Brazil breaking the death record.  





• The labour law, Bolsonaro causing agglomeration. 
• A debate on the use of hydroxychloroquine to treat Covid-19 
• Bolsonaro in conflict with the Supreme Federal Court.  
• Brazil`s Covid-19 death record.  
• Unemployment rising  
• Emergency aid.  
• The possible resignation or impeachment of President Bolsonaro.  
• Social media removing content due to classifying fake news posts about coronavirus shared by 
Bolsonaro.  
• Bolsonaro appoint a new Minister of Health who resign after almost a month.  
 








• Emergency aid 
• Bolsonaro avoiding the press. 
• Records in deaths and infected.  
• The controversy with the use of Hydroxychloroquine.  
• Protests, both pro and against Bolsonaro.  
• Unemployment. 





• The debate about the use of Hydroxychloroquine which Bolsonaro promote.  
• The contamination of ministers. New records in deaths and infected.  
• A possible vaccine (mostly the Chinese one).  
• The absence of care and protection for the indigenous communities once faced with the virus.  
• Bolsonaro and his wife catches the virus.  
• The rising unemployment. 
August 
2020 
• The disagreement on protecting indigenous communities against covid-19. 
• Brazil reaching 100,000 covid-19 Deaths.  
• Hydroxychloroquine.  
• Bolsonaro criticising the media. 
• Bolsonaro and the Congress/The Supreme Federal Court argue.  
• Emergency aid.  
September 
2020 
• Increasing emergency aid.  
• Bolsonaro being ambiguous about whether vaccine be mandatory or not. 
• Bolsonaro downplaying the pandemic in Brazil. 
October 
2020 
• The upcoming U.S. election. 
• The use of Hydroxychloroquine.  
• Using the Chinese vaccine and Bolsonaro saying it won’t be mandatory.  
• The indigenous community. 
November 
2020 
• Bolsonaro say masks don’t work.  
• Emergency aid and spending of pandemic funds.  
• Bolsonaro defend the use of Hydroxychloroquine. 
December 
2020 
• Bolsonaro defend the use of Hydroxychloroquine.  
• Bolsonaro causing agglomeration.  
• The start of the vaccination.  
• Bolsonaro and Doria (the governor of São Paulo clashes over vaccine) 
 
Table 4.4. Lists the main tendencies in the Folha coverage on "Bolsonaro coronavirus" there is 
a lot of information to be interpreted. To get a better idea of how these different topics have 
manifested themselves over time. For the sake of simplicity in the timeline, I have structured 
and coded all topics into 15 categories.28 The 15 categories will be explained and accounted for 
on the next page following figure 4.3. 
 
28 See Appendix Attachment 7., and 8. For an overview of which of the topical bullet points from table 4.4 have 





Figure 4.3: Timeline of trending topic.29 Based on data from table 4.4. 
 
 





The very first publications in Folha on Bolsonaro and COVID-19 focused on China, the origin 
of the virus and Brazilians in China contracting the virus and their return to Brazil. That was 
true for January and February. Once the virus really spread and thus started to have an impact, 
Folha published 1242 pieces in March mainly addressing what the virus meant for the national 
and international economy (Marked as "2. Financial downside" in Figure 4.3). This was perhaps 
part of the "shock" reaction at first. Folha would also publish content on how the President and 
Congress/Governors were disagreeing from the very start in March on how to tackle the virus 
(Marked as "3. Bolsonaro clashing with institutions" in Figure 4.3). 
Another prevailing tendency becoming evident in the Folha coverage is the power struggles 
and constant battles between the President and the Congress/the Supreme Federal court. These 
topics are also coded as "3. Bolsonaro clashing with institutions" in Figure 4.3. From as early 
as March, Folha wrote a lot about how Bolsonaro on one side with Congress and Governors on 
the other side had two completely different ideas on how to tackle the virus that had just started 
to spread. When Bolsonaro fired the minister of health (Mandetta) in April, he got replaced by 
Nelson Teich who resigned shortly after a month due to pressure from Bolsonaro. By the end 
of the year, in December 2020, Bolsonaro and the Governor of São Paulo whose name is Doria 
clashed over the subject of the vaccine.  
Bolsonaro was from March and onwards reportedly shaking hands with supporters and 
disobeying rules of maintaining a social distance and abstained from/strictly limited physical 
contact with other people. As Figure 4.3 shows, marked as "5. Bolsonaro and agglomerations" 
this tendency proved lasting from March and throughout June, before re-emerging again in 
December. Bolsonaro would reportedly cause agglomerations, deny the seriousness of the 
pandemic, say masks don't work, in addition to encouraging people to enter hospitals to film 
what he meant was a big capacity with lots of free emergency beds. In other words, and as 
shown in Figure 4.3: Bolsonaro underestimated the virus from March till October, after which 
the denialist rhetoric and actions silenced somewhat.  
In addition to noting that Bolsonaro has been reportedly downplaying the seriousness of the 
virus according to Folha, I wish to draw attention to the long and big debate on the use of 
Chloroquine or Hydroxychloroquine as it is sometimes referred to. As made account for in the 





hydroxychloroquine does not have clinical benefits in treating COVID-19. 
Hydroxychloroquine is "a treatment for malaria, lupus erythematosus, and rheumatoid arthritis, 
and has been studied as a possible treatment for COVID-19. Current data shows that this drug 
does not reduce deaths among hospitalised COVID-19 patients, nor help people with moderate 
disease" (World Health Organization 2020c).  
Nevertheless, table 4.4 and figure 4.3 show how Folha has published content where Bolsonaro 
has argued for the use of hydroxychloroquine since April, with this being a tendency every 
single month throughout 2020 with only the exception of September. The decline in Bolsonaro 
defending and preaching about hydroxychloroquine share a similar trend as the decline in 
September on new cases of infected by COVID-19 per month (not accumulated) per 100,000 
people. This is visualised in figure 4.1.The use of hydroxychloroquine was first written about 
in April, and regardless of Folha publishing reports on how the remedy did not show an effect 
on COVID-19, Bolsonaro continued to promote and praise the alleged effect of 
hydroxychloroquine. Comparing this very topic to a different populist in power under the 
pandemic, Bolsonaro proves very persistent. The U.S President at the time, Donald Trump, 
embraced hydroxychloroquine just like Bolsonaro did, in the early months of the COVID-19 
pandemic (Bump 2020). Yet unlike Bolsonaro who kept defending and pushing for use of 
hydroxychloroquine, Trump's obsession with the remedy rose and fell in 40 days, when he did 
not get any support and was contradicted repeatedly by medical expertise (Bump 2020). This 
did however not stop Bolsonaro, who kept going on about wanting to use hydroxychloroquine, 
despite growing resistance in evidence against it.  
The Folha coverage was also characterized by topics such as the rising unemployment, the 
COVID-19 financial emergency aid and financial downsides of COVID-19. Financial 
downsides to COVID-19 were reported in the beginning. Rising unemployment was reported 
on for some time during May till July, before disappearing. While financial emergency aid 
caught attention from April till June, disappearing and re-emerging in August-September and 
again in November. Thus, the financial topic was present all year but changed character by 
appearing with different subtopics. The situation involving the COVID-19 vaccine caught many 
Folha headlines. Bolsonaro changed his tone about the vaccine several times and denied at first 
that Brazil would ever buy it. Nevertheless, Folha could after reporting on it since August, 





Table 4.4 and figure 4.3 provide insight among other things showing how Bolsonaro from the 
very beginning of the pandemic and throughout 2020 opposed in various ways the Congress, 
Governors and the Supreme Federal courts attempt to impose functioning restrictions limiting 
the spread and thus consequences of the virus. Several topics emerge in March/April holding 
high intensity in the first half of the year before disappearing.   
Bolsonaro casing agglomerations where he touched people emerged in Folha's coverage in 
March, before disappearing from the publications before re-emerging in December. The topics 
regarding hydroxychloroquine (coded as 7) and Bolsonaro chasing with institutions (coded as 
3) shared the tendency: emerging at the beginning of the pandemic, appearing until June-July, 
before disappearing and re-emerging in the second half of the year. This tendency coincides 
with the new cases of infection and deaths by COVID-19 in Brazil, as shown in Figures 4.1 and 
4.2. The figures display a rise/high in infected and deaths from March throughout July, before 
descending somewhat before numbers of infected starting to rise again in early fall 2020 and 
continuing to rise for the rest of the year (see figure 4.1 and 4.2).  
  
4.3.2 Bolsonaro’s populism during COVID-19  
The pandemic struck Brazil just as the current government was introducing reform 
agenda that can be described as a mixture of economic liberalism and conservatism. The 
ineffective and delayed response to COVID-19 was surprising given Brazil`s history of 
responding capably and promptly with successful policies and services as well as its 
efficacy in controlling health risks and disease such as smoking, HIV/AIDS, and, more 
recently, the Zika virus. (…….) Unfortunately, the denialist stance by Brazil`s Federal 
Government and pro-government protestors has generated a polarized political conflict 
with most state and local governments, as well as with the scientific and academic 
community (Dal Paz, Levcovitz and Bahia 2021, 390). 
 
As Dal Paz, Levcovitz and Bahia remind us of why Brazil is an interesting case. One thing that 
is different in Brazil now from when they tackled the other mentioned health crisis in the quote 
above, is that Brazil now is governed by a populist president. When Folha interviewed the 
World Health Organization Assistant Director General for Access to Medicines, Vaccines and 





fact (Zanini 2020). Simão told Folha that Brazil had a unified Health System with a “reasonably 
efficient epidemiological surveillance structure”, after saying she had seen some neglect in 
Brazil in the sense that a perception some showed about the virus only having an effect on 
people over 65 years, was not true (Zanini 2020). Simão, the Assistant Director expressed that 
Brazil was expected to tackle the pandemic in accordance with its good Health System (Zanini 
2020).  
After analysing the Folha articles concerning COVID-19 and Bolsonaro, using the search words 
"coronavirus Bolsonaro", I have observed to which extent the four mechanisms have been 
present. Analysing the Folha database it became clear that some discussions, topics, and 
subjects were more frequently written about. As I have provided an overview of the publications 
and which tendencies have been yielding month by month, I now dedicate the following pages 
to look more deeply into blaming outsiders and victims, contempt for institutions, denialism, 
and suspicion of elites.  
The four mechanisms occur to different extents and at different times with different intensity. 
Firstly, my analysis found Mechanism (1) Blaming outsiders and victims to be evident all 
through the year 2020. At the beginning of the pandemic, Bolsonaro blamed the media. This 
phase was followed by Bolsonaro blaming China and the "faggot" behaviour he meant people 
were showing, in the later part of 2020.30 The mechanism of blaming outsiders and victims did 
not go away, but it changed the character and group defined as outsider or victim. Secondly, I 
found that the mechanism (2) Contempt for institutions was also present in Bolsonaro's 
COVID-19 approach all year in 2020. The contempt for the Ministry of h 
Health strongly influenced Bolsonaro's approach to the pandemic in the starting phase (from 
March throughout May). That was followed by Bolsonaro fighting the Supreme Federal Court 
the rest of the year. 
Thirdly, the mechanism (3) Denialism my analysis found to be characterising Bolsonaro's 
COVID-19 attitude the whole year of 2020. Bolsonaro's denialism was strongest and most 
intensive in the first half of 2020. Bolsonaro denied the seriousness of COVID-19 by refusing 
 
30 Disclaimer: The language used when citing Bolsonaro does not represent the opinions, views, or values of the 
author. The language used when citing Bolsonaro is not modified despite being hateful. Bolsonaro s language 
(including his hate-speech) is kept intact and cited as directly as possible given the translation, in order to show 





to comply with restrictions to prevent spread such as refusing to wear a mask, touch, greet and 
hug supporters, cause agglomerations, deny the scientific effect and importance of a potential 
vaccine and constantly arguing for the use of hydroxychloroquine. From August 2020 
Bolsonaro's denialism became less intense and mostly focused on promoting and defending 
hydroxychloroquine. Finally, mechanism (4) Suspicion of Elites was somewhat overlapping 
with mechanism (2) contempt for institutions, nevertheless, I did find that Bolsonaro's populism 
regarding COVID-19 did have a suspicion of elites. It is worth noticing that several publications 
used in the analysis are exemplified as containing more than one mechanism. In other words: 
the mechanism is somewhat overlapping in the Folha coverage, and several Folha publications 
containing one mechanism indeed contained several of the other mechanisms.  
4.3.2.1  Mechanism (1): “Blaming Outsiders and Victims” 
 
“The populist rhetoric animates, specifies the significance of, and justifies the popular 
mobilization; and the popular mobilization instantiates the populist rhetoric in concrete political 
activities” (Jansen 2017, 33).  
By performing some structured searches in the Folha de São Paulo, I display to which extent 
Bolsonaro have been using rhetoric to blame outsiders and victims. As presented in the theory 
chapter, there are mainly two potential consequences: (1) it becomes increasingly challenging 
to find the actual cause of the pandemic and why it spreads. (2): it may also lead to an 
underestimation of the pandemic. By analysing the Folha data I find Bolsonaro's approach to 
COVID-19 several signs of Bolsonaro blaming outsiders and victims. I also find that Bolsonaro 
largely underestimates the pandemic in his rhetoric. That causes difficulty in finding the actual 
cause of the pandemic and why it spreads. 
McKee et al. (2020, 2) as well as Greer et al. (2017, 40) argue that the populist politicians of 
the contemporary world today display an approach where they aim at appealing to groups in 
society that have been left behind for various reasons such as for example the loss of traditional 
industries. Populists furthermore sees a room of opportunity exploiting a misfortunate group 
who is searching for someone to blame, resulting in populists creating a narrative where the 
blame for the misfortune is placed on an identifiably different group (McKee et al. 2020, 2). 
McKee et al. (2020, 2), as well as Greer et al. (2017, 40), argue that the populist politicians of 





society that have been left behind for various reasons such as the loss of traditional industries. 
Populists furthermore see a room of opportunity exploiting a misfortunate group who is 
searching for someone to blame, resulting in populists creating a narrative where the blame for 
the misfortune is placed on an identifiably different group (McKee et al. 2020, 2). On December 
20th, 2020, an article titled "See what Bolsonaro has already done to confront measures to 
combat the coronavirus" was published in the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo (Arcanjo 
2020a).31  The journalist, Daniela Arcanjo based in São Paulo mainly reporting on politics and 
economics, entered the article with the lead paragraph: "President makes offensive in sequence 
against almost unanimous recommendations of doctors and scholars".32, 33 The article referred 
to a pronouncement made by Bolsonaro on March the 24th 2020, where the President attached 
governors and the press by giving the press the fault for the worsening health crisis. The 
pronouncement ended with Bolsonaro saying he would not get infected due to his "athlete's 
history" (Arcanjo 2020a). In the Folha coverage on Bolsonaro and COVID-19, Bolsonaro does 
not often place blame where it belongs. Instead of telling people to keep a social distance and 
follow the measures from the WHO, Bolsonaro turns a blind eye to those recommendations and 
continuously fights them, mainly through his contempt for the institutions. As a consequence, 
it becomes increasingly challenging to find the actual cause of the pandemic and why it spreads.  
Furthermore, The COVID-19 vaccine got much attention in the Folha coverage during the fall 
and winter of 2020. Bolsonaro stated that the Chinese vaccine would not be effective, saying it 
did not generate confidence because of its country of origin (Arcanjo 2020a). Although 
Bolsonaro to a lesser degree can be said to explicitly blame outsiders and victims, he did in 
November addressed the Brazilian public by saying that Brazil had to "stop being a faggott 
country" and face the coronavirus pandemic (Chaib 2020, my translation).34 Bolsonaro implied 
that the high numbers of deaths and infections had to do with the "faggott" way Brazilians were 
handling COVID-19. McKee et al. (2020, 2) state that populists may create a narrative where 
they blame a groups actions for the misfortune. And this group pointed out as perpetrators are 
often identifiably different from the victims (McKee et al. 2020, 2). In the case of Brazil and 
 
31 Original ´ in Portuguese: Veja o que Bolsonaro já fez para confrontar medidas de combate ao coronavírus 
32 «Ingress» på norsk. Den korte teksten som følger rett etter tittel.  
33 Original in Portuguese: “Presidente faz ofensiva em sequência contra recomendações quase unânimes de 
médicos e estudiosos”.  
34 My translation. The original quote is: “‘Brasil tem que deixar de ser um país de maricas, diz Bolsonaro sobre o 





COVID-19, Bolsonaro rhetoric as displayed in Folha 2020 coverage, does include Bolsonaro 
implying and blaming groups for COVID-19, although not to a very extensive degree. As the 
timeline in Figure 4.3. Have shown, this blaming of outsiders and victims did not end but 
changed form. 
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric concerning COVID-19 shows signs of placing blame on victims and 
outsiders. The populist style that is evident in Bolsonaro’s way of leading, contain elements of 
him blaming outsiders and victims, creating false narratives, blaming the press and media, and 
distrusting the quality of the Chinese vaccine due to its country of origin. Bolsonaro blamed the 
media in the starting phase of the pandemic (March-July), and then placed blame and mistrust 
towards China and "Faggots" towards the end of the year 2020. As made account for in my 
chapter on theory, there are several potential consequences of the mechanism of blaming 
outsiders and victims.  
As made account for in the theory chapter, there are mainly two consequences: (1) it becomes 
increasingly challenging to find the actual cause of the pandemic and why it spreads. (2): it may 
also lead to an underestimation of the pandemic. I argue that Bolsonaro's approach to COVID-
19 as seen with a lens of mechanism (1) blaming outsiders and victims, by the method: 
analysing the Folha coverage, there are clear signs of Bolsonaro blaming outsiders and victims, 
as well as an underestimation of the pandemic and a difficulty in finding the actual cause of the 
pandemic and why it spreads in Bolsonaro's rhetoric.  
 
4.3.2.2 Mechanism (2): “Contempt for Institutions” 
 
As opposed to stable institutions, contempt for institutions may result in an unstable and 
unpredictable ad hoc attitude in policy responses. Bolsonaro's contempt for institutions was to 
a large degree evident in the Folha coverage. The President's attitude towards COVID-19 was 
more than anything characterised by his contempt for institutions. Having that said, the 
contempt for institutions is at some points challenging to differentiate from the suspicion of 
elites, as the first feature of contempt for institutions is contempt for elites and for traditional 
institutions that are populated by elites (McKee and Struckler 2017, 669). Nevertheless, I have 





Governors in this section, under "contempt for institutions". Some of the incidents mentioned 
here contain features of the other mechanisms. This is done to avoid repetition.  
Potential consequences of contempt for elites we might look for are that the policy may be 
wobbly and vary over time, messaged going out to the public may be contradicting what other 
institutions signalise, and the response to the pandemic might be inefficient as a result of this. 
Folha reporters Lee, Schiavon and Quirolo (2020, my translation) state that: “From March to 
June, the country experienced a period of political tension fuelled weekly by the friction of 
President Jair Bolsonaro (without a party) with governors,35 Congress, and the Supreme Federal 
Court, in addition to his contempt for the coronavirus”. 
The publication goes on arguing that Bolsonaro and his relationship with the Supreme Federal 
Court was the most turbulent one. At the beginning of the pandemic, Folha reported on February 
29th that, unlike international and other national leaders, Bolsonaro had a more discrete tone in 
the fight against COVID-19. Minister of Health (at the time) Luiz Henrique Mandetta lead the 
right against COVID-19 (Coletta and Fernandes 2020). On March 15th, 2020, Bolsonaro 
participated in a pro-government protest calling for military intervention (Coletta et al. 2020). 
During this protest, Bolsonaro ignored COVID-19 guidelines by touching supporters, not 
wearing a mask, and holding several protesters cell phones to take selfies. Even though 
Bolsonaro at first said the protest would be postponed and held at a later time, he changed his 
tone and used his social media heavily to encourage demonstrations in different parts of the 
country (Coletta et al. 2020). Brazil had 200 confirmed cases and 1917 suspected cases of 
COVID-19 at the time (Arcanjo 2020a). A similar situation occurred on the 19th of April 
Bolsonaro participated in and encouraged supporters to participate in a protest in Brasília. 
Bolsonaro criticised several public institutions both implicitly and explicitly. The protest called 
for the Supreme Federal Court to close, and for military intervention (Arcanjo 2020b). 
Bolsonaro went against the advice of the Ministry of Health by encouraging crowds to form. 
During this protest, Bolsonaro spoke to the protesters saying: "It is now the people in power, 
you have an obligation to fight for your country", and "everyone in Brazil has to understand 
that they are submissive to the will of the Brazilian people" (Arcanjo 2020b, my translation). 
 
35 “De março a junho, o país viveu período de tensão política alimentada semanalmente por atritos do presidente 
Jair Bolsonaro (sem partido) com governadores, Congresso e Supremo Tribunal Federal, além do menosprezo 





"There are certain governors who are taking extreme measures that are not up to them, such as 
closing airports, highways, shopping malls and fairs," said the President on March 20th (Lee, 
Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). The day after, Bolsonaro continues attacking Witzel (governor 
to Rio), and Doria (governor to São Paulo) who Folha characterise as two of Bolsonaro's main 
critiques regarding his COVID-19 approach, in addition to both being potential presidential 
candidates for the next Brazilian election (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). When Doria 
imposed a 15-day quarantine for the state of São Paulo mandatory closing shops, bars, and 
restaurants, Bolsonaro said "[Doria] is a lunatic. It is making politics on this crisis" (Lee, 
Schiacon and Queirolo 2020, my translation). Bolsonaro released a statement on March 24th, 
2020, where he attached governors and blamed the: "Soon the people will know that they have 
been deceived by these governors and by a large part of the media in this issue of the 
coronavirus" (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020, my translation). 
McKee et al. list that "the second feature is populist's attitude towards public health institutions. 
Populist leaders tend to discredit, neglect, deny necessary funding and leave key positions 
unfilled within the public health intuitions." (Carvalho and Lopes 2020). During this protest, 
Bolsonaro's rhetoric when speaking to the protesters was characterised by mechanism suspicion 
of elites as the President creates a narrative between the institutions he is criticising (The 
Supreme Court, the Congress, the governors) and the "reasonable" people (his supporters). 
Since the beginning of the pandemic, the President and the at-the-time minister of health 
disagreed (Cancian 2020b). The battle between Bolsonaro and Luiz Henrique Mandetta who 
was minister of Health at the starting phase of the pandemic is a clear manifestation of 
Bolsonaro`s contempt for institutions. I also found this battle to cause a predicted consequence: 
wobbly and unstable policies. Mandetta frequently and repeatedly disagreed with Bolsonaro 
and even contradicted him publicly on actions to combat the coronavirus (Chaib and Uribe 
2020). Mandetta was fired by Bolsonaro on April the 16th. Bolsonaro criticised and blamed 
Mandetta on several occasions, expressing distrust towards the ministry of health as a public 
institution, blaming Mandetta for the loss of lives caused by COVID-19 as Mandetta had 
refused to use/encourage the use of hydroxychloroquine (Boldrini 2020). The Minister to 
follow Mandetta was Nelson Teich, who Bolsonaro said he chose because he expected Teich 
to be able to act balancing preventing coronavirus deaths yet minimizing the economic impact 





institutions (A institution Bolsonaro has high regards for) ended up serving as Minister of 
Health for one month, before resigning in May 2020 after being pressured to expand the use of 
hydroxychloroquine (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). In denying the seriousness of the 
pandemic the President fired two ministers of health who did not comply with his views on 
restrictions and priorities in the pandemic. According to Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo (2020), 
two minister layoffs stand out: Sergio Moro (Minister of Justice) and Luiz Henrique Mandetta 
(Minister of Health). Moro, who is a former judge, left the post accusing Bolsonaro of trying 
to interfere with the Federal Police. The allegation led to an investigation.  
On June 6th the government restricted the release of COVID-19 data in Brazil. The Ministry of 
Health's data portal had gone offline the previous night showing only the numbers registered 
the last day. A couple of days later, the Ministry of Health announced that it would keep 
cumulating numbers of deaths and confirmed COVID-19 cases (Arcanjo 2020a). Bolsonaro 
confirmed that the methodology for disclosure of COVID-19 data would be changed. Folha 
stated that the change would mean the disclosure of numbers of minor deaths-, adding to the 
criticism that the government intended to manipulate the data from the pandemic (Folha de São 
Paulo 2020u). When Bolsonaro was later asked about the change in methodology during a visit 
to Formosa, he refused to answer (Folha de São Paulo 2020u). The new methodology went 
against what the WHO recommend, and the model Brazil abandoned is used by virtually all 
countries (Arcanjo 2020a). Brazilian official numbers will now only be reported to show total 
recoveries, new cases, and deaths in the last 24 hours (Folha de São Paulo 2020v). An attempt 
for enforcing sanctions was introduced when the at the time Minister of Health Mandetta and 
former Minister of Justice Sergio Moro signed an ordinance that established punishment for 
those who failed to comply with medical orders and health authorities during the COVID-19 
outbreak in Brazil (Onofre 2020). Folha wrote about this saying the current (new) ministers of 
health and justice revoked the rule after pressure from Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro had criticized the 
measures that were originally signed in March. In addition to that, the publication by Onofre 
states that Bolsonaro is against applying quarantine to contain the expansion of COVID-19 
(2020). Thus, I argue that Bolsonaro discredited the ministry of health as an institution's 
authority showing contempt for institutions, resulting in mixed signals on correct containment 





Furthermore, Bolsonaro showed contempt for institutions in a publicity video summarizing and 
officially communicating the government's proposal for the pandemic from March the 27th 
(Arcanjo 2020a). Folha wrote that the President's son (who is a Senator) Flávio Bolsonaro, 
shared the video on the social media accounts constituting the Bolsonarista network.36 The 
video repeated the message “Brazil cannot stop”.37 The message of the video was in contrast 
with the message from health authorities, and on March 28th the Federal Court in Rio de Janeiro 
prevented the campaign from being broadcasted on radio, TV, Newspapers, Magazines, 
Websites or any other medium both physically and digitally (Arcanjo 2020a). On March 26th, 
2020, Bolsonaro by decree characterised religious activities and lottery houses as essential 
activities that could not be prevented during the COVID-19 pandemic (Arcanjo 2020a). The 
day after, The Federal Court suspended Bolsonaro's decree's validity.38 The Federal Court 
prohibited the Federal Government from adopting measures contrary to social isolation as 
means of prevention. What I wish to underline by mentioning this incident is to exemplify how 
Bolsonaro undermines and “battles” the institution by fighting their decision to make people 
socially isolate (Arcanjo 2020a). 
The Federal Court prohibited the Federal Government from adopting measures contrary to 
social isolation as means of prevention. What I wish to underline by mentioning this incident 
is to exemplify how Bolsonaro undermines and "battles" the institution by fighting their 
decision to make people socially isolate (Arcanjo 2020a). Furthermore, Bolsonaro criticized 
the governor of São Paulo (João Doria) and the Governor of Rio (Wilson Witzel) saying they 
were committing civil disobedience when they ignored the Presidents wish to expand the 
number of activities considered essential (Arcanjo 2020a).  
 
36 A Brazilian study published September 2020 analysed almost 200,000 messages from 21 support groups for 
Bolsonaro, between September and November (Piaia and Alves 2020, 136). The study found that: “i) a small 
group of participants concentrated most of the posts; ii) the most shared links include other social media, such as 
YouTube and Facebook; iii) there were centralized actions of campaign to neutralize damages to the image of 
Bolsonaro, as well as to coordinate votes for its parliamentary base. The results show the potentialities of using 
WhatsApp, but also emphasize that the application should be understood within a broader communicative 
network.” (Piaia and Alves 2020, 136). 
Furthermore, the study underlined that they saw a “consolidation of professional practices in parallel with the 
efforts of volunteers through extensive network infrastructures that interconnect and feedback various platforms, 
often beyond the boundary of practices considered legal by the national regulatory framework.” (Piaia and Alves 
2020, 136).   
37 My translation. The original text was: “O Brasil não pode parar”  





In July the Brazilian Senate approved a proposal to impose a new law restricting fake news, 
which Bolsonaro criticized saying he would veto the bill in turn (Caram 2020c). The President 
justified the veto saying the bill would limit freedom of expression.  
The proposal which was approved by the Senate entails the requirement to keep the records of 
the message forwarding chain on WhatsApp thus making it possible to identify the source of 
illegal content (Caram 2020c). 39  Only messages forwarded more than five times (which 
constitutes virtualization) will be stored and only made accessible by court order when the 
message has reached a thousand or more users (Caram 2020c).40   
According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, populists often question the legitimacy of liberal 
institutions, such as the rule of law (2012, 14). Much of the Folha coverage on Bolsonaro and 
the coronavirus has been about Bolsonaro fighting with institutions and their expert advice, 
such as the Ministry of Health or The Supreme Federal Court. Another example of that is when 
Bolsonaro encouraged followers to enter hospitals and start filming on June 11, he did so 
knowing that entry to health facilities without authorization is not allowed (Arcanjo 2020a). 
“[If] There is a field hospital or a public hospital near you, find a way to get in and film. A lot 
of people are doing this, and more people have to do it to show if the beds are occupied or not. 
If the expenses are compatible or not. It helps us” (Arcanjo 2020a, my translation).41 The 
following day, Gilmar Mendes a Justice of the Supreme Federal Court tweeted that the Public 
Ministry should act against those who defend this practice: "Invading hospitals is a crime – 
encouraging it too. The Public Ministry (The PGR and the State MPs) must act immediately. It 
is shameful – not to say ridiculous – that public officials lend themselves to feeding conspiracy 
theories, putting public health at risk", wrote Gilmar on Twitter (Arcanjo 2020a, my 
translation).42 This shows how Bolsonaro and an institution, in this case, the Supreme Federal 
Court, is battling publicly disagreeing on a major subject. Bolsonaro does not show respect for 
 
39 The most popular messaging application in Brazil. Over 95% of internet users in Brazil use the application 
(Webcertain 2020).  
40 “To spread something virally, throughout the internet by aggregation and distribution on social media sites, 
streaming sites and other methods of social content sharing” (Collins 2021). 
41 The original quote: “[Se] Tem hospital de campanha perto de você, hospital público, arranja uma maneira de 
entrar e filmar. Muita gente está fazendo isso e mais gente tem que fazer para mostrar se os leitos estão ocupados 
ou não. Se os gastos são compatíveis ou não. Isso nos ajuda” (Arcanjo 2020a). 
42 The original quote: “Invadir hospitais é crime – estimular também. O Ministério Público (a PGR e os MPs 
Estaduais) devem atuar imediatamente. É vergonhoso – para não dizer ridículo – que agentes públicos se 





the law nor the public health sector. I argue that this is a piece of clear evidence for Bolsonaro 
showing contempt for an institution.  
Another example of this is the use of masks in Brazil. Bolsonaro laid down several vetoes on 
the mask bill in July (Arcanjo 2020a). That very bill had been approved by Congress earlier the 
same month. Bolsonaro managed to veto and remove many articles of the law so that the final 
version that got approved was a very weak version of the original (Arcanjo 2020a). Folha has 
addressed the situation with the COVID-19 vaccine. Bolsonaro's behaviour and attitude towards 
the vaccine contain elements of both contempt for institutions, denialism, suspicion of elites 
and blaming outsiders and victims. In October, the Minister of Health Pazuello said he sought 
to require doses of the Chinese vaccine to be used in Brazil. Following Pazuello's plans, 
Bolsonaro publicly denied buying the Chinese vaccine saying it would not happen (Arcanjo 
2020a). In December Folha reported that Bolsonaro changed his mind several times regarding 
the vaccine (Arcanjo 2020a). 
Contempt for institutions is as opposed to stable institutions, an unstable and unpredictable ad 
hoc attitude in policy responses. It became evident analysing Bolsonaro's contempt for 
institutions that it was to a large degree evident characterising the Folha coverage on Bolsonaro 
and COVID-19. McKee et al (2020, 2) state that a prominent feature of contempt for institutions 
is contempt for elites and traditional institutions that are populated by elites. Bolsonaro shows 
contempt for these institutions by his way of ignoring their guidelines and policies in handling 
COVID-19. More than anything dominating Bolsonaro's populism is his contempt for 
institutions. There is much evidence in the Folha coverage to support this notion. Bolsonaro 
repeatedly ignored COVID-19 guidelines set by the ministry of health. The President touching 
supporters, abstained from wearing a mask, encouraged several demonstrations which caused 
crowding as well as personally participating several times in protests, encouraged his supporters 
to enter public hospitals and film, took selfies with fans. Even though Bolsonaro at first said 
the protest would be postponed and held at a later time, he changed tone and used his social 
media heavily to encourage demonstrations in different parts of the country on more than one 
occasion. My analysis made it clear that Bolsonaro has shown several signs of contempt for 
institutions. He has fired two ministers of health at an extremely critical stage in the pandemic 
(in April and May 2020). In addition to not following the guidelines set by his ministers of 





misinformation about his ministers of health's "wrongful" understanding of how to avoid 
spreading COVID-19. Furthermore, The Supreme Federal Court and Bolsonaro have been in a 
battle throughout the pandemic, constantly fighting and disagreeing on what information to 
spread and what information to view as truthful.  
As mentioned in the theory chapter: one main consequence of contempt for institutions is how 
politics may be wobbly and vary in an unforeseen way. Bolsonaro has certainly vetoed, refused, 
and fought against his institutions and their attempts to impose and successfully implement 
COVID-19 restrictions. My analysis leaves no doubt that Bolsonaro attitude towards COVID-
19 is heavily characterised by him showing contempt for institutions. The time that Bolsonaro 
could have used to respond to the pandemic may be wasted by arguing and fighting between 
the different institutions as they keep disagreeing. I also found that there have been 
contradicting messages on COVID-19 going out to the public. This was defined as a potential 
consequence of contempt for institutions.  
 
4.3.2.3 Mechanism (3): “Denialism”  
 
Populists practice the art of denialism (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 392). They reject evidence 
by being reluctant to be constrained by institutions (Akkerman 2003, 156). In addition to 
showing contempt for institutions, Bolsonaro's populism is heavily characterised by him 
denying the seriousness of COVID-19. By denying the seriousness of the pandemic Bolsonaro 
also showed contempt for the institutions (health) as they made policies and statements stressing 
the seriousness of the situation. These are in other words somewhat overlapping, and several 
Folha publications containing mechanism (3) Denialism, indeed contained several of the 
mechanisms (2) Contempt for institutions. As mentioned in the theory chapter, denialism may 
result in a delay in response. Furthermore, denialism may cause large conflicts between 
institutions such as a ministry of health and the populist. Lastly, denialism can prevent the 
public from receiving truthful and valuable information on the health crisis. 
Bolsonaro's approach to the pandemic has been repeatedly downplaying its seriousness. On 
March the 17th 2020 Folha interviewed Brazilian economist Rodrigo Soares, professor at 
Columbia University and "one of Brazils most respected economists in academia" (Fraga 2020). 
At this early phase of the pandemic, Folha wrote "… Soares sees Brazil having some advantages, 





demonstrated, from the beginning, to be attentive to the pandemic" (Fraga 2020). Furthermore, 
Soares says that Brazil did not take things as serious as it should and that Bolsonaro referred to 
COVID-19 as a "small crisis" (Fraga 2020). 
In Bolsonaro's third radio and television statement concerning COVID-19, Bolsonaro said that 
the government had since the beginning of the crisis been concerned with containing "panic 
and hysteria" (Coletta 2020k). Bolsonaro compared COVID-19 to a "cold" or a "flue" saying 
the media intensified the situation to spread hysteria (Coletta 2020k, my translation). McKee et 
al. explained the mechanism of denialism by quoting UK prime minister Boris Johnson who 
had advised the public to go about with their normal daily lives. The Brazilian populist 
Bolsonaro have done similarly. At the very beginning of the pandemic in March 2020, 
Bolsonaro said in an interview with CNN Brazil which was mentioned in a Folha publication, 
that the measures taken in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic were "extremism" and "hysteric" 
(Carvalho and Resende 2020). Furthermore, a few days later, Bolsonaro spoke publicly at a 
press conference saying that it would not be this "small flue" that would knock him down,43 
implicitly downplaying the seriousness of COVID-19 referring to it as not only a "flue" but a 
small one (Uribe, Chaib and Coletta 2020). Bolsonaro on several occasions demonstrated that 
he denied the pandemic by encouraging people to participate, and by participating himself in 
protests with large crowds. Bolsonaro also participated in a protest on March 29, where 
Bolsonaro defended the population`s return to work (Arcanjo 2020a). On that same day, the 
President ignoring directions from the Minister of Health himself, Bolsonaro drove out to visit 
local shops and causing crowding in Brasilia (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). Bolsonaro 
uploaded videos from his Brasilia tour on Twitter. That night, Twitter for the first time deletes 
posts from the President on the network. The video from the Brasilia tour got removed by 
Twitter based on being content violating the rules of use by potentially putting people at greater 
risk of transmitting the virus (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). Following Twitter, Facebook 
also decides to delete publications posted on the President's platform. Facebook stated it could 
"cause real harm to people", and that it was "misinformation". The Facebook post was also 
from the Brasilia tour (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020, my translation). 
 





Furthermore, Bolsonaro participated in the protest in Brasília on April 19th (Arcanjo 2020b): 
“by joining the protesters, Bolsonaro once again encouraged crowds in the midst of the new 
coronavirus pandemic, contrary to recommendations from the WHO and the Ministry of Health” 
(2020, my translation). On March 17th Bolsonaro said: “this virus brought a certain hysteria”.44 
The following day he participated in demonstrations causing agglomerations. He then posted 
on his social media “I inform you that my 2nd test for COVID-19 was NEGATIVE.45 Good 
evening everyone” (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020, my translation).  
Bolsonaro frequently went out in the streets contrary to guidelines from both the WHO and the 
Minister of Health (Mandetta at this time). On April 9th, Bolsonaro walked around to go to the 
bakery. The Next day, Bolsonaro visited the Armed Forces Hospital as well as a pharmacy in 
the Southwest of the country (Arcanjo 2020a). The same day, Bolsonaro is reported "he first 
scratches his nose with the back of his right hand, seconds later, starts greeting an elderly 
woman and other supporters" (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020, my translation). Moffitt and 
Tormey (2014, 392) who consider the ideational approach to populism say that populists 
choose/cherry-pick evidence coming from experts. Folha reported that Bolsonaro when asked 
about how he defended wanting to reopen schools while numbers of deaths were high and still 
rising, Bolsonaro answered that he was not an undertaker and that he no longer wanted to talk 
about the relationship between COVID-19 mortality and restrictive measures (Saldaña 2020). 
On June 22nd Bolsonaro appealed to governors and mayors to start reopening trade. Bolsonaro 
stated, "there may have been a bit of an exaggeration" in the way the WHO and other authorities 
dealt with the pandemic of the new coronavirus (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). Although 
Brazil just passed a total of 50 thousand COVID-19 deaths, Bolsonaro did not say anything 
about it (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020).Bolsonaro demonstrated that he chooses which 
evidence he wants to relate to, and which he wants to deny. This article (and quote by Bolsonaro) 
was also discussed in a Folha publication by Folia's editorial secretary written by Roberto Dias, 
with the title "The coronavirus created a new kind of denialist" (Dias 2020, my translation).  
According to McKeen et al. denialism is something to be expected to be found at the core of 
populist's empirical approach to COVID-19 (2020, 2). The World Health Organization has 
 
44 “Esse vírus trouxe uma certa histeria” (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020).  
45 «Informo que meu 2º teste para COVID-19 deu NEGATIVO. Boa noite a todos” (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 





advised against large groups of people coming together and causing agglomerations. The WHO 
has also advised to limit social contact as much as possible (World Health Organization 2020g). 
Despite these guidelines, Folha report that Bolsonaro has on several occasions caused 
agglomerations ignoring social distancing and not abstaining from physical contact (Arcanjo 
2020a). When Bolsonaro went to Goiós on May 2nd, he caused crowds to take photos, hugged 
people including the elderly and touched people (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). 
"…Bolsonaro went to other centres of agglomeration and removed his mask while greeting 
supporters" (Arcanjo 20202a).46 On June the 27th he again caused crowding when we went to 
visit Minas Gerais. He then did not wear a mask, greeted supporters without maintaining the 
appropriate distance (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). A few days later, on July 7th, 
Bolsonaro announced that he had contracted COVID-19: "I'm perfectly fine", Bolsonaro 
announced wearing a facemask to CNN Brazil in an interview (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 
2020, my translation). 
Another example of a phenomenon Bolsonaro focuses on by "cherry picking evidence", is 
Bolsonaro handling of hydroxychloroquine (also knowns as chloroquine). Former U.S 
President Trump fired the director of the US health department`s Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority on the support for the use of hydroxychloroquine (Smith 
2020b). Similarly, to Trump, Bolsonaro denied the evidence on hydroxychloroquine by firing 
two ministers of health who refused to give in and comply with Bolsonaro policy to actively 
push for the use of the remedy in COVID-19 treatment (Folha De São Paulo 2020t). As seen in 
table 4.4, Bolsonaro defended the use of hydroxychloroquine starting from April and 
throughout the rest of 2020.  
Bolsonaro continued to promote the alleged effect of hydroxychloroquine despite publications 
of international studies denying the effect (Watanabe 2020). Bolsonaro chooses which studies 
he wants to listen to, and thereby denies a large share of information.  
In a Folha article from the 6th of August 2020, Bolsonaro is quoted: "We had a protocol from 
the Minister of Health that ordered hydroxychloroquine to be applied only in serious conditions. 
 
46 My translation. The original frase: “.........Bolsonaro foi até outros focos de aglomeração e retirou a máscara 





It is throwing away pills. You don't need to have knowledge or brains to understand that it is 
throwing away pills and loosing lives" (Carvalho and Lopes 2020, my translation).47  
A different example of Bolsonaro denying evidence by cherry-picking is how the President 
have been defending "vertical isolation" (Arcanjo 2020a). This without any type of study. 
Bolsonaro has been arguing that a "vertical isolation" would consist of isolating only those who 
are at risk, namely the elderly and people with underlying diseases (Arcanjo 2020a).  
By July, the virus had hit its peak in numbers of new cases of infection and deaths. During a 
visit to Rio Grande Do Sul in the capacity of opening a new military school, Bolsonaro told the 
press: "I am sorry. I am sorry for the deaths. People die every day from a series of causes. Its 
life, its life….", "What are you afraid of? Face it!" (Sperb 2020, my translation). Again, in 
November, Bolsonaro addressed the Brazilian public by saying that Brazil had to "stop being a 
faggott country" and face the coronavirus pandemic (Chaib 2020, my translation).48  
Bolsonaro's rhetoric when facing the public was often, more than anything, characterised by his 
constant denialism of the seriousness of COVID-19. Regarding the subject of the COVID-19 
vaccine, Bolsonaro first stated that he did not want to force anyone to take the vaccine (Carvalho, 
Uribe and Cancian 2020). After displaying Denialism (McKee et al. 2020,s) by denying the 
importance and necessity of the vaccine it later became known that Bolsonaro had signed a law 
stating compulsory vaccination (Folha De São Paulo 2020s). Folha reported that in October 
Bolsonaro answered a supporter who on the internet expressed fear for the vaccine, whereby 
Bolsonaro answered "It will not be purchased" (in capital letters) (Arcanjo 2020a). By 
December however, the vaccine was considered a fundamental part of the Brazilian 
immunization program (Arcanjo 2020a). On December 17th Bolsonaro once again declared that 
he would not take the COVID-19 vaccine, after which he defended hydroxychloroquine 
(Valadares 2020). Two days later on December 19th Bolsonaro said "…. Hurrying for the 
vaccine is not justified, because it will affect people's lives" despite the recent increase in cases 
 
47 My traslation. The original quote was: “Tínhamos um protocolo do ministro de Saúde que mandava aplicar 
apenas em estado grave a hidroxicloroquina. É jogar comprimido fora. Não precisa ter conhecimento nem 
cérebro para entender que é jogar comprimido fora e perder vidas” 
48 My translation. The original quote is: “‘Brasil tem que deixar de ser um país de queers’, diz Bolsonaro sobre o 





and deaths (Arcanjo 2020a, my translation). 49 However, against the vaccine, Bolsonaro seemed 
on the 19th, by the 27th he had a different view. In a social network, Bolsonaro wrote that 
government is "in a hurry to obtain a safe, effective, and quality vaccine (…)" (Arcanjo 2020a, 
my translation).50 Bolsonaro denying the seriousness of the pandemic became evident the day 
Brazil passed the 10,000 dead marks by COVID-19 (Arcanjo 2020a). Dias Toffoli, the 
President of the Supreme Federal Court released a statement underlining how grave the 
situation was. The Judiciary and the Legislative declared mourning (Arcanjo 2020a). The 
Senate hoisted the flag at half-mast and declared that any celebrations or festivities were 
forbidden within the National Congress while the mourning lasts. Amid this, Bolsonaro toured 
one of Brazils "postcard" destinations; Lake Paranoà, where he spent the afternoon with a water 
bike ride (Arcanjo 2020a).  
Again, in November, Bolsonaro addressed the Brazilian public saying that Brazil had to “stop 
being a faggott country51” and face the coronavirus pandemic (Chaib 2020, my translation).  
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric when facing the public was often, more than anything, characterised by 
his constant denialism of the seriousness of COVID-19.  
When COVID-19 hit Brazil (and Folha's publications) in March and onwards, Bolsonaro 
advised the public to go about with their live normal lives, expressing no need for the 
"extremism" and "hysteria" he characterised the ministry of health's preventive measures as. 
Diethelm and McKee (2009, 2-3) argue that denialism includes populists promoting cherry-
picking evidence. My analysis found that Bolsonaro on several occasions demonstrated that he 
cherry-picked his evidence by ignoring evidence from the WHO on the negative effect of 
crowding. Bolsonaro frequently encouraged people to participate and participated in large 
crowds such as protests. Furthermore, the analysis showed that Bolsonaro cherry-picked 
evidence by ignoring directions from the ministry of health, by driving out and seeking large 
crowds of supporters. When seeking out these crowds, Folha reported that Bolsonaro often 
touched people, did not wear a mask, hugged the elderly and did not withhold the guidelines of 
social distance. After which, Bolsonaro posted videos of his tour to Brasilia in March, both 
 
49 Original quote: “(….)Pressa para a vacina não se justifica, porque você mexe com a vida das pessoas” 
(Arcanjo 2020a).  
50 The original quote: “(….) Pressa para obter uma vacina segura, eficaz e com qualidade(...)” (Arcanjo 2020a).  
51 My translation. The original quote is: “‘Brasil tem que deixar de ser um país de queers’, diz Bolsonaro sobre o 





Twitter and Facebook ended up deleting the content Bolsonaro had uploaded of his tour. The 
two networks said it was "misinformation" and that it "caused real harm to people", potentially 
putting people at risk of transmitting the virus.  
McKee et al. (2020, 2) also listed in addition to cherry-picking evidence, that a populists 
denialism makes him/her promote conspiracy theories, false expertise, moving goalposts and 
employing a range of logical fallacies. The list of times and subjects for when Bolsonaro have 
denied the seriousness of the pandemic is long. Bolsonaro defended the reopening of schools 
while the number of deaths was still rising. When Brazil passed a total of 50,000 COVID-19 
deaths, Bolsonaro did not address it. After changing the methodology for disclosure of COVID-
19 data, Bolsonaro refused to answer when questioned about why. Denialism may lead to a 
delay in response. In the Bolsonaro case, much evidence suggests that Bolsonaro had a delayed 
response; throughout 2020 he constantly denied the seriousness of the pandemic and presented 
no response, which thus means a delayed response, in adopting or promoting containment 
measures to avoid the spread of COVID-19. Bolsonaro's response may be very late, or it just 
might never show up.  
Furthermore, Bolsonaro showed who he cherry-picked evidence in the hydroxychloroquine 
matter. From April and for the rest of 2020, Bolsonaro kept arguing for the use of the remedy 
which never had any scientific evidence of the effect on treating COVID-19. Bolsonaro fired 
ministers of health when they did not comply and promote the use of the remedy. In addition 
to that, Bolsonaro defended "vertical isolation" without any type of study to defend it. 
Bolsonaro on several occasions' cherry-picked evidence. When the country passed its 10,000 
dead marks by COVID-19, Bolsonaro went to tour a Brazilian "postcard" destination ignoring 
the dead mark completely. The Folha coverage of Bolsonaro and COVID-19 in 2020, is from 
start till finish characterised by Bolsonaro displaying a frequent denialist approach to the 
pandemic.  
4.3.2.4 Mechanism (4): “Suspicion of Elites” 
With the suspicion of elites, the media plays an important role. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 
11-12) argued that populists typically describe the media that criticize their political message, 
as members of the "corrupt elite". My analysis of Bolsonaro's approach to COVID-19 and how 





displaying suspicion of elites. As accounted for in the theory chapter, suspicion of elites can 
influence to which extent the public will comply with any imposed or suggested measure related 
to COVID-19. Another protentional consequence of suspicion of elites is that the public might 
not trust correct information on virus spread and measures to take to avoid it. If the public has 
a suspicious and untrusty attitude towards the media, then this can have a massive influence as 
media are crucial in spreading information about the pandemic and the measures.  
According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 11-12), populists often refer to the media 
(especially media that criticize their political stance) as part of the "corrupt elite".  
Bolsonaro several times blamed the press for the worsening of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
Bolsonaro's statement released on March 24th, 2020, he blamed the press for the worsening of 
the health crisis with COVID-19 (Arcanjo 2020a). "Soon the people will know that they have 
been deceived by these governors and by a large part of the media in this issue of the 
coronavirus" (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). Furthermore, Folha reported that on May 5th, 
Bolsonaro had told reporters to "shut up", when he was asked about the recent changes in the 
Federal Police (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020, my translation). On May the 25th, Folha 
decided due to the lack of security to suspend their news coverage from the Alvorada 
presidential palace port temporarily (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020). The decision was due 
to the lack of security, as some security measures protecting reporting journalists outside the 
presidential palace had been weakened and removed. On that day, Bolsonaro passed by close 
to the reporters at the presidential palace saying, "The day you are committed to the truth, I will 
speak to you again" (Carvalho 2020i). 
Folha reported that the crowd of supporters waiting for Bolsonaro to arrive at the Alvadora 
daily shouted and was swearing to journalists. Bolsonaro's supports attitude to the journalists 
took a sharp turn that day. People from the crowd yelled to Folha journalist: "No shame. You 
don't show reality." And "I don't know how you manage to sleep at night. You don't represent 
the Brazilian population! Communist media(….)" and "Scum! Trash! Mice! Rats! Bolsonaro 
until 2050! Rotten press! Communists!" and "junk media". Journalists had on several earlier 
occasions been physically injured by Bolsonaro´s supporters demonstrating in favour of the 
President in from of the Alvorada (Carvalho 2020i, my translation). Other media networks also 





spreading suspicion of the media, which can have a big influence as media are important as 
they share information about the pandemic and the measures.  
In mid-May, Bolsonaro called on a group of businessmen to pressure governors for the 
reopening of trade. Bolsonaro said "it is war" asking the business sector to "Play hard" with the 
governors (Arcanjo 2020a). 52 , 53  The theory provides an understanding of the mechanism 
"suspicion of elites" to be that a populist sees elites in society (either cultural, economic, 
political) as a whole group who actively work against the "general will" of the people (Mudde 
and Kaltwasser 2017, 11-12). Bolsonaro implicitly puts business interests against the interests 
of the local Brazilian governors. Bolsonaro also stated that there is a "political problem" where 
the objective is to "break the economy to reach the government" (Coletta, Caram and Uribe 
2020).54  Thus, I understand that Bolsonaro is implying that governors are shutting down 
businesses in an attempt to negatively influence the government.  
When Bolsonaro personally attended demonstrations in Brasilia on May 3rd, he participated 
with his supporters who were protesting against the Supreme Federal Court and Congress. The 
former minister of justice, Sergio Moro was also a target of protest (Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 
2020). Bolsonaro may be perceived as joining "the people" on the street, protesting against the 
political elite. Following the Brasilia protest, Bolsonaro broadcasted live: "I am sure of one 
thing, we have the people at our side, we have the Armed Forces at the side of the people, by 
law, by order, by democracy, and by freedom. And more importantly, we have God with us" 
(Lee, Schiavon and Queirolo 2020, my translation). Bolsonaro finished the live sent statement 
saying: "I ask God that we don't have any problems this week. We have reached the limit, there 
is no more conversation, from now on, we will not only demand, we will enforce the 
Constitution, it will be enforced at any price, and it has a double hand" (Lee, Schiavon and 
Queirolo 2020, my translation). 
By asking his followers to film the interior of public hospitals to "reveal" that there was a lot of 
free bed capacity, Bolsonaro implicitly expresses mistrust towards the public health sector. The 
President went live on social networks on June 11 encouraging followers to participate, saying 
 
52 My translation. The original quote is: “"é guerra" (Arcanjo 2020a). 
53 My translation. The original quote is: “Jogar pesado” (Arcanjo 2020a).  






that if the images they would take showed any abnormality that would be dealt with by the 
Federal Government and the Federal Police (Arcanjo 2020a). 
Analysing Bolsonaro's COVID-19 attitude and suspicion of elites, I found that Bolsonaro shows 
several signs of this. Although this was not the most prominent feature of Bolsonaro's overall 
populism, suspicion of elites had been present in Bolsonaro's approach to COVID-19. It is 
worth noticing that suspicion of elites might be challenging to separate from contempt for 
institutions. However, with Suspicion of Elites, the media plays an important role. As Mudde 
and Kaltwasser (2017, 11-12 argued that populists typically describe the media that criticize 
their political message, as members of the "corrupt elite". I found that Bolsonaro on more than 
one occasion displaying suspicion of elites. My analysis found Bolsonaro calling for the closure 
of the Federal Supreme Court and for a military intervention using the rhetoric of having several 
elements of "us vs them", and "we the people" – showing suspicion of elites by framing 
themselves (Bolsonaro and his supporters) as "the people". Also, in line with media playing a 
key role in populists' approach to COVID-19 given their suspicion of elites; Bolsonaro several 
times blamed the press for the worsening of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to that, I 
found that Bolsonaro released a statement blaming the press for the worsening of the health 
crisis with COVID-19.  
Furthermore, Folha decided due to the partial removal and weakening of security to suspend 
their news coverage from the Alvorada presidential palace port temporarily. A potential 
consequence of suspicion of elites maybe that society becomes characterised by a public not 
complying with the imposed or suggested measures related to COVID-19. As my analysis 
shows clear signs of Bolsonaro frequently encouraging crowding and thus preventing this group 
of the public (those who support Bolsonaro) to comply with social distancing restrictions, for 
one. Furthermore, as mentioned in the theory chapter, a potential consequence of suspicion of 
elites may be that Bolsonaro influences the public to distrust the media and their information 
on COVID-19 less. I argue that Bolsonaro's way of spreading suspicion of the media have made 
his supporters question the information provided by the media on containment measures. As 
Bolsonaro on several occasions blamed the press for the pandemic and called the media corrupt, 
this might have had serious consequences on the public acknowledging measures and adopting 





4.4 Pandemic and populism – match made in heaven?    
Which features characterise Bolsonaro's populism and how do these features become evident 
during a pandemic? 
 
When Folha interviewed the World Health Organization Assistant Director General for Access 
to Medicines, Vaccines and Pharmaceuticals Mariângela Simão in the middle of March 2020 
she told Folha that Brazil had a unified Health System with a “reasonably efficient 
epidemiological surveillance structure”. The Assistant Director expressed that Brazil was 
expected to tackle the pandemic in accordance with its good health system (Zanini 2020). In 
understanding populist behaviour and crisis management, Kavakli (2020, 3-4) argues that 
populists generally distrust elites to such an extent that this is defined as a key feature to 
populism. During the pandemic in Brazil, Bolsonaro showed distrust towards medical elites 
such as the WHO or his own ministry of health, for example.  
Having assessed the Bolsonaro case, this provides insight on populism in relation to crisis 
management. Given the theoretical foundation presented in the chapter on theory I, in this 
following section present a discussion linking the insight to the existing theory. My choice of 
case to study was Brazil being a least-likely case (George and Bennett 2015, 121), and 
Bolsonaro, being an extreme case (Gerring 2007b, 101). Bolsonaro was presumed to following 
an expert-oriented/ professionally based approach to COVID-19. I assumed Brazil to handle 
COVID-19 similarly to western countries. Brazil has been interesting to study because of the 
populist president and the possibility to isolation the effect of populism. A study of a different 
Latin American country like Nicaragua or Honduras would involve studying an economically 
challenged country with weak health services and lack of medical expertise. This would likely 
influence our findings. In Brazil, many prerequisites to handling the pandemic relatively good, 
is present.   
 
In the starting phase of this study, it became evident that Brazil had much potential to handling 
the COVID-19 relatively well given their expertise and level of institutions. It was also noted 
that if we ended up seeing a bad handling of the pandemic, then the extreme case populist 
Bolsonaro could be believed to have influenced the COVID-19 handling, given the nature of 
the case which allows for an isolation of the effect of populism. The findings are interesting. I 
started by expecting Brazil to be a - country given its levels of expertise and development - that 






Various scholars who have studied populism (Jansen 2015; Mudde 2017; Zúquete 2015) argue 
that populism is driven by a strong discontent towards elites. When COVID-19 hit the world, 
and Brazil, The WHO entered the stage and came with measures, recommendations, and 
guidelines. Being an international health organization, The WHO as an elite brought out a large 
discontent in Bolsonaro. On multiple occasions Bolsonaro and his government explicitly or 
implicitly acted against the recommendations from the WHO: showing discontent. McKee et 
al. (2020) argue that a central feature to Mechanism (2) “contempt for institutions” is a 
populist’s contemptuous attitude towards public health institutions. Throughout the pandemic 
during 2020 Bolsonaro have worked against both explicitly and implicitly: the ministry of 
health. Bolsonaro was clearly heavily influenced by contempt for institutions.  
The elite vs. the people notion has a strong basis in the literature on the school of thought I have 
focused on. As my theoretical foundation is based on the ideational approach, the feature of 
populists painting people vs. elites is central. Key in understanding populism is also the strong 
personification of the leader – the high-profile, passionate character presenting a strong 
enterprise (Dean and Maiguashca 2020, 13). Bolsonaro is no exception to this "rule". 
Throughout the pandemic in Brazil Bolsonaro had multiple outbursts preaching unambiguous 
messages, placing blame or calling institutions out on alleged misconduct concerning COVID-
19. Those who criticised Bolsonaro's ways were the ones he would passionately place blame 
on. McKee et al. (2020) argue that contempt for media is largely characterising Mechanism (4) 
"suspicion of elites". The Brazilian media were one such element who Bolsonaro, in different 
ways, making it difficult for during the pandemic. Bolsonaro's contempt for the media may also 
be characterised as a form of contempt for elites. This shows how Bolsonaro also falls under 
the category of suspicion of elites. Furthermore, based on McKee et al. (2020) stating that 
populists who place blame for misfortune on an identifiably different group are blaming 
outsiders and victims, I argue that Bolsonaro, by blaming China and "faggots" proves himself 
blaming outsiders and victims.  
In addition to that, the evidence tells us that populists are not necessarily taken by the gravity 
of a pandemic. We might have seen that in the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson behaviour; 
however, I have at least now seen that with Bolsonaro. I found several clear features of 





pandemic, and that has had consequences for pandemic management. This corresponds with 
Diethelm and McKee's assumption of how populists in the face of crisis tend to cherry-pick 
their evidence and downplay the crisis (2009 2-3). Bolsonaro showed large signs of Mechanism 
(3) denialism, during his COVID-19 approach.   
A report published on May 28th, 2021, by the University of São Paulo titled "A timeline of the 
federal strategy of dissemination of COVID-19",55 reports that Bolsonaro and his government 
not only caused the somewhat unexpectedly high numbers of death and infected in Brazil, but 
also intentionally spread the virus (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 1). The purpose of the 
report was to "map and analyse the legal norms in repose to COVID-19 in Brazil" (Universidade 
de São Paulo 2021, 5). The report supports the notion that populist politics have had an impact 
on how COVID-19 evolved in Brazil. 
The conclusion of the report is unambiguous. "The results [of the survey] dispel the persistent 
interpretation that there would be incompetence and negligence on the part of the Federal 
Government in managing the pandemic" (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 19, my translation). 
In a different section of the study, the report states that: "On the contrary, the systematization 
of data reveals the commitment and efficiency in favour of the widespread dissemination of the 
virus in the national territory, with the declared objective of resuming economic activity as 
quickly as possible." (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 4, my translation). The study is based 
on assessing the Federal Government's actions. In one section, the study argued that the Federal 
Government had constantly encouraged the population to be exposed to the virus as well as 
encouraging the population to not comply with preventive sanitary measures (Universidade de 
São Paulo 2021, 3). This, the study argued was based on denial of the seriousness of the disease. 
Furthermore, the study stated that the Federal Government implemented this encouragement 
under the excuse that people should be brave and show courage (Universidade de São Paulo 
2021, 3).  
Assessing the report, I found that mechanisms (3) and (2), denialism and blaming outsiders and 
victims were visible in Bolsonaro’s ways. Based on the report, I find populism to have “real 
world” consequences, being something more than a discourse or a strategy. The report shows 
how Bolsonaro’s populism has largely characterised his COVID-19 response in Brazil. Given 
 





the evidence the report reveals, populism and crisis handling deserve to be taken with outmost 
seriousness. The report shows the impactful connection between populism and crisis handling. 
In Brazil we saw implications of the impact of populism on crisis handling. The Federal 
Government’s battle with The Supreme Federal Court and the battle with governors and mayors 
were also brought up. I found that Bolsonaro’s contempt for institutions and suspicion of elites, 
mechanisms (1) and (4) where observable in the report.  
 
Regarding the Federal Government and mayors and governors, the study finds that the Federal 
Government had systematically obstructed mayors and governors in their quest to impose 
containment measures (Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 4). The Federal Government's 
argument for hindering mayors and governors was the supposed opposition between protecting 
the health and protecting the economy. This, the study argues, resulted in the Federal 
Government spreading the idea that quarantine measures cause more damage than the virus 
(Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 4). Populism impacts what information the public accesses 
and how in times of crisis. When the Federal Government's approach became criticised, they 
attached whoever arguing against them: "attacks on critics of the federal response, the press 
and professional journalism, mainly questioning the dimension of the disease in the country." 
(Universidade de São Paulo 2021, 4, my translation).  
 
I have now shown what the Brazilian government has (failed to do) done battling the COVID-
19 pandemic. Much of the policy response to COVID-19 in Brazil has been initiated by 
subnational levels of government (Petherick et al. 2020, 10). This bakes the question; what have 
the Brazilian government done? By analysing the Brazilian case we collect some experience. 
Among other things, we can at least exclude that a populist would rise to the occasion if a 
serious enough situation, like a crisis, emerged, because that has at least not been the case in 
Brazil. In addition to that, I also wish to draw attention to how populism not only manifest itself 
in ordinary populist politics day-to-day or elections, or when mobilizing, but how we see 
populist features to a much larger extent in a more widespread way. Crises are also influenced 
by populism when a populist is steering the course of a country like we have seen in Brazil 
during COVID-19. 
As we have seen, this analysis shows that populism has indeed affected the COVID-19 crisis 
handling through; a mechanism (1) blaming outsiders and victims, mechanism (2) contempt for 





mechanisms were present in Bolsonaro's handling of the pandemic, blaming people for not 
being brave enough to face the virus, constantly fighting with the Supreme Federal Court and 
the Ministry of Health, denying the seriousness of the virus by actively promote spread to 
resume to economic activities as soon as possible, denying the importance of containment 
measures and spreading suspicion of media by characterising their information as corrupt and 
wrongful. Although I am not able to comment on to what extent the mechanisms have caused 
the deadly outcome of the pandemic, we do have a better understanding of which role populism 
has played in crisis management. I have performed a study that supports the expectation that 
denying science and letting populism run politics is bad for business in various ways and here 
we see it negatively affecting crisis management.  
When assessing populist Bolsonaro’s response to COVID-19 I analysed 2020 by means of 
limiting the study. Nevertheless, it has become clear that the evident tendencies of Bolsonaro's 
populism and how they have affected the Brazilian COVID-19 course did not stop once the 
calendar showed "2021". Tens of thousands have protested in cities throughout Brazil against 
Bolsonaro's COVID-19 response during May 2021 (Phillips 2021). There were protests in over 
200 Brazilian cities with slogans such as "This government is more dangerous than the virus". 
In June Bolsonaro lead a parade where hundreds participated by motorcycle in São Paulo, 
without wearing a mask, breaching local COVID-19 measures (Galf and Azevedo 2021). A 
public commission of inquiry investigating Bolsonaro's COVID-19 handling stated at the 
beginning of May 2021 that more than 90,000 lives could have been saved in Brazil had it not 
been for Bolsonaro's wrongful COVID-19 handling (Stefansen 2021). It is not unreasonable to 
think that populism has a large impact on how Brazil has been handling COVID-19. 
 
4.5 Summarizing the chapter 
 
By introducing, this chapter established the purpose of the analysis to come. I aimed at 
providing an analytical answer to the posed research question “How have populist 
governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis? - Which features characterise 
Bolsonaro's populism and how do these features become evident during a pandemic?  
The chapter has included a firstly presentation of the empiric COVID-19 situation in Brazil, the 





a step-by-step analytic review of the policy responses to COVID-19 and the earlier presented 
four mechanisms of populism, reviewing the mechanisms in light of evidence of the Brazilian 
case.  
From evidence of COVID-19 in Brazil in terms of cases of infected and numbers of deaths we 
learned how Brazil had high numbers of infected and deaths. The numbers of dead and infected 
was present despite Brazil’s institutional and financial capacity to handle the pandemic. As 
Brazil rank higher than its neighbouring countries on the continent, on measures such spending 
on research and development, bureaucracy with highest quality and social spending per capita 
it was noted that Brazil still did not show lower numbers of infected or dead by COVID-19. 
Despite what we might had been anticipating, regardless of Brazils expenditure on health, 
research, and social spending matches OECD levels.  
Nevertheless, Brazils COVID-19 deaths and infections show numbers similar or even worse 
than its Latin American neighbours. The descriptive account was followed by the analysis of 
Folha De São Paulo's coverage of "Bolsonaro coronavirus". The analysis showed a clear 
overweight of articles written containing "Bolsonaro coronavirus" in March reaching 1242 
articles. The following months display a continuous high number of publications before 
decreasing in numbers and flattens around 300-350 publications a month through the last part 
of 2020. This tendency is similar to the number of deaths and infected by COVID-19 in Brazil 
 
So, what kind of populism has Bolsonaro stood for? 
My analysis showed how Bolsonaro sat at the very key position in handling the pandemic; 
denied, showed contempt for institutions, suspicion of elites and blamed outsiders and victims 
for COVID-19. The development over time showed how the main emphasis was evident in the 
beginning of the pandemic, during the months of March, April, May, and June. After that, 
Bolsonaro was a bit less aggressive in his populism, with not as many conflicts and “scandals” 
within the categories of the four mechanisms, as he did during the early phase of the pandemic.  
 
I analysed the four mechanisms: blaming outsiders and victims, contempt for institutions, 
denialism, and suspicion of elites, to populism and found that they affected to different extents 
and at different times with different intensity. While I found Bolsonaro to be “completely” 
populist throughout the period of 2020 which I analysed, I did see him showing many signs of 





Bolsonaro constantly fought the Supreme Federal Court not only in the halls of power but also 
to his supporters on social media or during physical demonstrations calling for closure of the 
Supreme Federal Court (and for a military intervention).  
Bolsonaro’s denialism was very intense in his pandemic handling. He cherry picked evidence 
by ignoring reports on effectiveness of measures and kept promoting and praising 
hydroxychloroquine despite a larger and larger amount of evidence advising against the remedy.  
Characterizing Bolsonaro’s populism more than anything is his constant denial and cherry 
picking of evidence, as well as his large contempt for institutions (and to some extent, elites). 
In addition to that, I found Bolsonaro´s populism with all the four mechanisms to be most 
intense during the first half of the pandemic, before he became a bit more silent yet absolutely 
continued to practice his populist approach to the COVID-19 handling.  
 
I argue that mechanism (1) blaming outsides and victims, (2) contempt for institutions and 
mechanism (3) denialism and mechanism (4) suspicion of elites has distinguishes Bolsonaro’s 
populism in a COVID-19 context. The mechanism is somewhat overlapping in the Folha 
coverage, and several Folha publications containing one mechanism, indeed contained several 





















5.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
5.1 Studying a populist president´s COVID-19 handling  
 
Through a qualitative study of the newspaper Folha de São Paulo I attempted to answer my 
research question: How have populist governments responded to the COVID-19 pandemic 
crisis? Related to my case being Brazil, I had formulated a more specific sub question: Which 
features characterise Bolsonaro's populism and how do these features become evident during 
a pandemic?  
Studying how populism have influenced COVID-19 crisis management during COVID-19 had 
me face some restrictions affecting this study. Not being able to travel to Brazil and conduct 
interviews, was probably the largest and most defining limitation I had to acknowledge. As 
mentioned in the literature review, four mechanisms of populism are predicted to play a part in 
crisis management under populism during COVID-19. My analysis pursued this paved path, 
bringing the four mechanisms one step further and analyzing the president's COVID-19 
response in Brazil, and to which extent these mechanisms were present in the response. My 
data foundations have been the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo, a well-reviewed and 
trustworthy source of information. My analysis mainly focused on Folha publications, 
qualitatively assessing 6325 relevant Folha publications. In addition to that, I have reviewed a 
report issued by the Universidade de São Paulo (2021) which listed all Federal Government 
policy responses to COVID-19. This information has been structured in my chapter dedicated 
to analyzing, which also included an empirical outlook on the Brazilian COVID-19 
performance in deaths and infected.  
"When the history of the COVID-19 pandemic is written, it will be possible to identify many 
individual decisions by politicians that influenced its course" (McKee et al. 2020, 2). This study 
presented four central mechanisms to populism accounting for their foundation in the scientific 
literature on populism. During this entire study, my focus has been on the research question, 
which leads me to find that these central mechanisms are related to politics and populism, and 
especially crisis management and populism as we saw was present in Brazil.  
This study set out with the aim of assessing a “how question”, therefore the focus has been on 





denialism, and suspicion of elites, have been present in the handling of the pandemic.  
 
With respect to the research question, the current study found that the Brazilian President when 
faced with COVID-19 practised an attitude towards the pandemic which was characterized by 
denialism, blaming outsiders and victims, suspicion of elites and contempt for institutions. Now, 
the scope of this study does not allow for implications on whether or not Bolsonaro's attitude 
as it has been, has had an affected on the high numbers of deaths and infected in Brazil. 
However, what I can say for sure is that Bolsonaro's attitude, which is characterized by 
denialism, blaming outsiders and victims, suspicion of elites and contempt for institutions, have 
indeed affected Brazilian politics during 2020. Furthermore, the report from the Universidade 
de São Paulo (2021) did establish that the Bolsonaro government had neglected to handle the 
pandemic to such a large extent that lives could have been saved had it not been for their 
wrongful handling. The Report even went as far as stating that the government had spread the 
virus on purpose.  
 
5.2 How populism has affected crisis management  
 
During this study I have gained knowledge on how populism affects crisis management and 
that a populist is still populist even when there is a gigantic crisis no one has seen the size of 
before. I consider this to be a contribution to the field. In this following section I will show how. 
My findings are important for several reasons. First, it addresses a gap in the literature both 
theoretically and empirically on populism and crisis handling. My findings showed how a 
populist (in my case: Bolsonaro) did not suddenly change and become anti-populist. Based on 
my findings, there are good reason to believe that the populists’ actions (being characterized by 
blaming victims and outsiders, contempt for institutions, denialism and suspicion of elites) has 
affected the crisis management. The literature presented the notion that Brazil would be 
believed to cope with COVID-19 in a relatively good way, given its robustness in terms of 
being an advanced state compared to its Latin American neighbors. However, the implications 
of this study found that there has been denialism, attacks on elites, contempt for institutions, 
and wrongful blaming of victims and outsiders. It is not unthinkable that the reason why Brazil 
is showing such bad statistical performance in terms of infected and deaths by COVID-19 is 







There are discussions (Weyland 2021) about whether populism is a strategy (superficial 
strategy) aiming at attracting votes in order to gain political power, or if populism is something 
more profound. I chose to adopt the ideational approach to populism in this study, as this 
approach allows for an emphasis on the rhetorical “pure people” vs. “corrupt elite” which has 
been fitting to my case. I found Bolsonaro to appeal rhetorically to the masses in a directly 
personalistic way. Yet, my findings may be said to give some indications pointing to that 
populism is something more profound. Because, for Bolsonaro populism has not just been a 
strategy to win votes, that is if populism is a strategy just to win votes, then Bolsonaro has 
chosen an unsuccessful approach to vote-winning. As made account for in my theory chapter, 
Freeden (2017) is one of the critics of the Ideational approach to populism. Freeden argues that 
populism is not a “ideational insubstantial fingerprint”, which Freeden states that Mudde 
portrays populism as. I agree with Freeden’s critique. I argue that Bolsonaro’s populism is 
deeper and more pervasive, as we observed how Bolsonaro did not become serious and in such 
a situation as Brazil facing COVID-19, one could imagine that it would have made sense for 
him to save lives. In this sense, populism becomes very evident and appears as a strong 
characteristic.  
Therefore, I find that it is reasonable to think that what we saw in Brazil may be an indication 
that populism in the case of Bolsonaro was not a pure election strategy. Populism is not just 
rhetoric, populism has direct political consequences; populism is something deeply rooted and 
characterizing his entire political approach. These findings may be one of the contributions 
provided by this study.  
 
5.3 The road ahead for research on populism and crisis handling 
 
Despite these promising results, questions on populism and crisis handling remain.  
The findings raise intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of populism in crisis 
handling. We cannot generalize my findings to any great extent, but what we have learned in 
general about populism and crisis management have shed light on some knowledge in a large 
room of unanswered questions waiting to be studied.  
 
My study does not directly answer what populism is, but to the extent that I can say something 





is a strategy. My case showed how populism lasted throughout the crisis handling and can be 
believed to have had an effect on the crisis handling as I did find populism to have an effect on 
the politics implemented during the crisis. A study with focus on populism during COVID-19 
in one of the other large countries ran by a populist during COVID-19, would provide 
interesting insight, comparing results and findings with this study. Future studies on the current 
topic are highly recommended.  
 
Furthermore, one of the strongest impressions I am left with after analyzing the case and 
gaining knowledge on these specific conditions, is how I observed that Bolsonaro overall 
seemed to have prioritized the economy above all. This is supported in the Universidade de 
São Paulo (2021) report. Now my theoretical framework did say that Bolsonaro as a populist 
could be believed to show suspicion of elites (mechanism 4.). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 
13) state that populists would show suspicion towards those holding economic power. This 
differs from the findings presented here. From what I gather after analyzing Bolsonaro’s crisis 
management, he has not showed much suspicion towards the financial elites – he has flirted 
with the financial sector with constant reassurances that the economy is the most important, 
promising to open stores and “keep Brazil going” - during the campaign “Brazil cannot stop”.  
In the early days of the pandemic a large dilemma arose for any government; “closing down 
the economy, letting it scream before being able to re-open later when spread is low or gone, 
OR, keeping the economy open while probably causing more virus spread letting people 
scream but the economy survive?” In my case, Bolsonaro preached about herd immunity yet 
also relying on very little scientific grounding, acting as a typical populist. Bolsonaro focused 
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Attachment 1.: Table displaying new cases of infected persons per month per country in 2020 (not accumulated) per 100,000.  
Data in figure collected from the WHO dataset: “Daily cases and deaths by date reported to WHO” (World Health Organization 2020f).
 
56 Average value for the following countries: Mexico, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
Month Argentina Bolivia Chile  Colombia Ecuador Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Brazil 56Average 
January 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
February 0 0 0 0 0.288 0.047 0 0 0 0 0.023691121 0.08370574 
March 18.2470747 8.43 129.22092 13.945328 112.6 7.7366 9.084921 26.20695807 89.3 4.5238 20.14219127 53.5409762 
April 75.2358045 83 656.18266 104.232387 1307 123.53 24.84158 933.1768708 91.3 7.0136 320.4461057 382.287039 
May 233.673819 667 4219.7568 411.983129 799.8 532.04 102.9151 3601.764971 55.2 36.506 1863.448831 355.8875 
June 1006.50419 1980 9557.8629 1292.84315 983.9 1036.4 165.0901 4033.595352 32.6 137.71 4164.790132 547.67592 
July 2649.453 3649 4091.2218 3660.86711 1652 1501.8 388.8062 3730.000661 89 415.98 5724.352952 914.749495 
August 4945.46906 3632 2977.938 6433.50423 1685 1436.5 1647.778 7343.854053 96.2 974.44 6130.731492 1048.08412 
September 7164.93642 1639 2708.2045 4336.34145 1272 1113.1 3258.932 5206.910393 127 1002.3 4261.137184 878.65699 
October 9360.92736 631 2494.2434 4666.69872 1807 1403.8 3210.668 2733.89018 299 622.53 3548.512996 1033.06793 
November 5998.72582 270 2208.6804 4896.57811 1437 1472.6 2708.584 1930.886838 713 367.52 3771.133724 997.507818 





Attachment 2.: New Cases of COVID-19 per month (not accumulated) including all countries, adjusted per 100,000. The values of the charter 
can be seen as numeric values in the attachment 1. 
 





Attachment 3.: New COVID-19 deaths per month per country per 100,000. Not accumulated.   
 





Attachment 4: Table displaying COVID-19 deaths per month per country in 2020 (not accumulated) per 100,000. 
 
 
Data in figure collected from the WHO dataset: “Daily cases and deaths by date reported to WHO” (World Health Organization 2020f). 
 
57 An average of Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
Month Argentina Bolivia Chile  Colombia Ecuador Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Brazil 57Average 
January 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
February 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
March 0.4450506 0.43 0.4221181 0.1986514 0.46 0.1568 0.425856 0.338352745 0 0.1052 6.44398E-06 0.17702014 
April 4.16122314 4.34 10.975072 5.14507114 50.36 12.142 0.851711 25.93012401 4.33 0.2455 23.12727254 1.81009421 
May 6.74251664 21.3 41.209284 11.6012415 141.1 61.501 0.283904 103.8435334 2.02 0.1403 108.3205445 0.81542903 
June 16.3556097 62 241.55711 44.7561594 67.23 135.08 0.425856 156.4727649 1.44 1.052 140.933742 0.97408915 
July 45.9737273 156 200.61165 126.103906 66.48 146.68 4.400509 292.182975 2.31 3.8575 154.0491467 3.5229995 
August 113.265379 185 98.511822 190.903991 51.69 144.68 35.20407 301.1647024 2.6 7.7501 143.7008649 15.1846692 
September 171.611513 257 78.144622 130.653023 273.8 100.21 74.38279 114.3324685 0.87 8.3813 102.3266908 27.8769072 
October 318.856505 69.9 75.611913 104.987262 75.98 111.07 78.7833 62.68753585 2.89 6.1369 80.12811021 29.2696577 
November 175.349938 21.2 63.212192 108.761639 45.53 115.12 50.81878 46.66191948 5.2 3.612 64.40194394 19.8768399 





Attachment 5: Table displaying population in numbers as of 2019 (The World Bank 2019). 
 















Attachment 6: References for the tendencies presented in table 4.4. The references present a 
selection of key sources.  
 




(Fernandes and Moreira 2020), (Leite 2020), (Fernandes 2020). 
 
February 2020 
(Coletta 2020a), (Uribe et al. 2020), (Cunha 2020), (Pupo, Resende 




(Moura and Narcizo 2020), (Coletta 2020b), (Mattoso 2020a), 
(Coletta 2020c), (Mattoso 2020b), (Mattoso 2020c), (Rodrigues 
2020), (Coletta 2020d) (Mattoso 2020d), (Gielow 2020a), (Folha De 
São Paulo 2020a), (Brant et al. 2020), (Arcanjo, Zanini and Linhares 








(Cancian 2020b), (Cancian and Fernandes 2020), (Coletta and 
Carvalho 2020), (De Sá 2020), (Mattoso 2020e), (Alencastro 2020), 
(Folha de São Paulo 2020b), (Fernandes and Fabrini 2020), (Saldaña 






(Coletta and Moraes 2020), (Folha de São Paulo 2020c),  (Machado 
2020a), (Resende 2020), (Watanabe 2020), (Bergamo 2020b), (Mena 
2020a), (Cancian, Saldaña and Chaib 2020), (Fernandes and Pupo 
2020), (Righetti and Gamba 2020), (Fernandes 2020b), (Linhares 
2020), (Brant 2020), (Folha de São Paulo 2020d), (Carvalho 2020a), 




(Folha de São Paulo 2020e), (Uribe 2020a), (Mattoso 2020f), 
(Boghossian 2020), (Tavares 2020), (Collucci 2020), (Teixeira 
2020a), (Caram 2020a), (Mena 2020b), (Carvalho 2020b), (Saldaña 




(Teixeira 2020b), (Folha De São Paulo 2020f), (Sperb 2020), 
(Carvalho 2020c), (Carvalho 2020d), (Folha De São Paulo 2020g), 
(Uribe 2020b), (Mattoso 2020g), (Coletta 2020e), (Mattoso 2020h), 





(Folha De São Paulo 2020h), (Folha De São Paulo 2020i), (Coletta 
2020h), (Pupo 2020), (Cancian and Coletta 2020), (Folha De São 
Paulo 2020j), (Caram 2020b), (Lemos, Marcedo and Resende 2020). 
 
September 2020 
(Bergamo 2020d), (Folha De São Paulo 2020k), (Marchewicz 2020), 
(Folha De São Paulo 2020l), (Amparo 2020), (Watanabe and Coelho 
2020), (Uribe and Pupo 2020),  
 
October 2020 
(Folha De São Paulo 2020m), (Folha De São Paulo 2020n), (Freire 
2020), (Carvalho 2020e), (Machado 2020b), (Carvalho 2020f), 
(Lemos 2020), (Teixeira 2020c), (Carvalho 2020g). 
November 2020 (Chaib 2020a), (Chaib 2020b), (Sassine 2020), (Folha De São Paulo 







(Folha De São Paulo 2020p), (Valadares 2020), (Carvalho 2020h), 
(Batista 2020), (Folha De São Paulo 2020q), (Richmond 2020), 
(Folha De São Paulo 2020r), (Amâncio 2020).  
 
 
Attachment 7: Table showing which categories the different numbers represent. These are 
the numbers and categories coded in the timeline, and all subjects presented in table 4.4 have 
























1. China and Brazilians in Wuhan.  
2. Financial downsides of COVID-19 
3. Bolsonaro clashing with Institutions 
4. Bolsonaro underestimating the virus. 
5. Bolsonaro and agglomerations 
6. COVID-19 financial emergency aid. 
7. Chloroquine and COVID-19. 
8. Brazil`s COVID-19 death records. 
9. Challenging unemployment 
10. Resignation or impeachment of Bolsonaro 
11. Social media deleting Bolsonaro's content 
12. Bolsonaro tries to escape/blame the press. 
13. Bolsonaro and the COVID-19vacine 
14.  The upcoming U.S. Election  





Attachment 8.: Table showing the different monthly subjects, (identical to table 4.4) and 




(1) The coverage is mainly focused on China and Brazilians in Wuhan.  




(1) The subject of the Brazilians in China, their return and quarantine rules. 
(2) The different financial aspects such as how the virus will affect/do affect   





(2) How the virus is affecting the world economy and currencies, weak USD, and    
      Brazilian investment sinking. 
(2) Fall in oil prices and in the Brazilian stock market. 
(3) Bolsonaro and Governors/Congress arguing on coronavirus handling.  
(4) Bolsonaro underestimating the virus. 
(5) Bolsonaro meeting Pro-Government protesters without a mask, while shaking  





(6) The discussion on emergency aid for people affected by COVID-19.  
(7) Chloroquine as medicine, and the distribution and debate about effects.      
(3) Henrique Mandetta (the minister of health) and his approach to the virus. 
(3) Mandetta gets fired due to disagreeing with Bolsonaro on virus handling 
(8) Brazil breaking the death record.  





(5) The labour law, Bolsonaro causing agglomeration. 
(7) A debate on the use of Chloroquine to treat Covid-19 
(3) Bolsonaro in conflict with the Supreme Court.  
(8) Brazil`s Covid-19 death record. 
(9) Unemployment rising 
(6) Emergency aid.  
(10) The possible resignation or impeachment of president Bolsonaro.  
(11) Social media removing content due to classifying fake news posts about 
coronavirus shared by Bolsonaro.  




(6) Emergency aid. 
(12) Bolsonaro avoiding the press. 
(8) Records in deaths and infected.  
(7) The controversy with the use of Hydroxychloroquine.  
(5) Protests, both pro and against Bolsonaro.  
(9) Unemployment. 
(4) Bolsonaro encouraging people to enter hospitals and film free beds in order to 
show that the capacity. 







(8) The contamination of ministers. New records in deaths and infected.  
(13) A possible vaccine (mostly the Chinese one).  
(4) The absence of protection for the indigenous communities facing the virus.  
(4)  Bolsonaro and his wife catches the virus. 
(9) The rising unemployment. 
August 
2020 
(4) The disagreement on protecting indigenous communities against covid-19. 
(8) Brazil reaching 100,000 covid-19 deaths.  
(7) Hydroxychloroquine. 
(12) Bolsonaro criticising the media. 
(3) Bolsonaro and the Congress/The supreme court argue.  
(6) Emergency aid.  
September 
2020 
(6) Increasing emergency aid.  
(13) Bolsonaro being ambiguous about whether vaccine be mandatory or not. 
(4) Bolsonaro downplaying the pandemic in Brazil. 
October 
2020 
(14) The upcoming U.S. election. 
(7) The use of Hydroxychloroquine.  
(13) Using the Chinese vaccine and Bolsonaro saying it won’t be mandatory.  
(3) Arguing with Congress on protecting the indigenous community. 
November 
2020 
(15) Bolsonaro say masks don’t work.  
(6) Emergency aid and spending of pandemic funds.  
(7) Bolsonaro defend the use of Hydroxychloroquine. 
December 
2020 
(7) Bolsonaro defend the use of Hydroxychloroquine.  
(5) Bolsonaro causing agglomeration.  
(13) The start of the vaccination.  
(3) Bolsonaro and Doria (the governor of São Paulo clashes over vaccine) 
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